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## UNIT 6 STATE VIOLENCE (TERRORISM, DICTATORSHIP, MILITARY)

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### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

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Since times immemorial political violence has attracted our attention for more than one reason. Often it has multiple forms, perpetrators, victims and purposes. The category of political violence include state and non-state actors; it may originate from internal or external sponsors; take forms that range from terrorism and guerilla warfare to sectarian violence, police actions, riots and assassinations. From Robespierre's 'reign of terror,' to the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood's motto of 'revolution sooner or later,' 'violence has often been used to generate publicity for a cause, besides attempting to inform, educate and rally masses "behind revolution". The 1880s, 1890s, the 1900s till the First World War saw an outright call for 'propaganda by deed', as a legible weapon to topple an established disorder.

The 1930s, however, witnessed a phenomenal change in protracted terrorist campaigns against governments. It was now used less to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed against governments and their leaders and more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens—Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, to name a few. While Europe wreathed under state-imposed violence against its own citizens, Asia experienced violent outcry for revolt, heralded by various indigenous/anti-colonist groups to oppose continued repression from colonial rule. The appellation of 'freedom fighters' instead of 'terrorists', came into fashion at this time. This position was best explained by PLO chairman, Yasir Arafat when he said: "The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorists lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and colonists, cannot possibly be called terrorists." By the late 1960s and 1970s, the usage expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside the colonial or neocolonial framework- entirely ideologically motivated organizations- the PLO, Left wing extremists etc.,

This went on till the 1990s, until scholars, since the end of the Cold War, stepped up

their efforts to identify the factors behind the onset, nature and termination of armed conflict in an era of unknown foes and unpredictable situations that now includes state and non state violence and insurgency and terror tactics. Peter Chalk, termed this under 'Grey Area Phenomena,' which he loosely defined as threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations—a setting in which standard military-based conceptions of power and security, have only limited relevance.

### Aims and Objectives

This Unit would enable you to:

- define the concept of state violence
- identify the types and theories of state violence
- describe the conditions of state violence in South Asia and India

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## 6.2 STATE VIOLENCE: THEORY AND TYPES

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**Theory on Greed and Grievances:** Though Aristotle once said, 'poverty is the parent of revolution and crime,' globalisation theorists of the present decade have underpinned personal greed and grievances as the major cause of armed conflict. According to them, globalisation represents two processes in greed theories. It brings changes in the state—particularly the erosion of state authority and public goods—which can make societies vulnerable to conflict; the other fostered by increased opportunities from transborder trade, both legal and illegal. As a result, "many civil wars are caused and fuelled not by poverty but by 'resource curse.' Data from Southeast Asia, distinctly show that, even those conflicts that has been categorised as "separatist," "communal", "ethnic" or "ideological," do have a clear element of 'greed' in them. The exploitation of mining opportunities in the Philippines has come into conflict with indigenous land rights and competition over resources, while ongoing violence in Papua, Sulawesi and Maluku in Indonesia, is not just religious or ethnic in character, but a tiff for land and resources exacerbated by environmental degradation. At the same time the greed theories do not talk about the greed of multinational corporations and the greed of the global elite that basis its profits on the extraction of resources from already poor countries. Instead they focus on the 'resource curse' as if just having a resource in a poor country is a curse itself rather than systemic poverty, colonialism and its forms being the curse.

A related set of theories applies the greed motive not to rebel groups but to corrupt governments, arguing that such governments engage in rent seeking and predation in order to enrich themselves, repay the support of allies and pay off potential adversaries. In the process they weaken the state's capacity to fulfill public service requirements and alienate groups that fail to receive the fruits of the government's benevolence. Ergo, groups in the periphery, mobilize in violent opposition to the government. In Indonesia, for instance, the top-down development approach that enabled three decades of rapid economic growth during Suharto's era was one-sidedly driven by the center. Profits from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Outer Islands were controlled by Jakarta, while a relatively small share of the revenue was directly returned to the provinces. The military was used to ensure compliance. As a result, separatist movement in some provinces—East Timor, Timor Lorasai, Aceh, Irian Jaya—carried social conflict to its ultimate extent, calling for the dissolution of natural ties and the founding of new nation-states.

Still other scholars have associated certain types of conflict with instabilities that arise from social change in an increasingly globalized world. Barber, for instance, blames violent resistance to modernity, cultural imperialism, socio-economic exploitation and loss of sovereignty as reasons behind armed conflict. Others focus on economic instability with increasing marketisation as reason behind public dissension. Amy Chua and Michael Mousseau, see the market not as neutral but as one bringing fundamental change and violent opposition.

**Grievance theory:** Besides, economic and greed factors, a competing set of theorists, see political grievances as one of the most important source of violent conflicts. According to them armed conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, among others, cannot be understood without reference to political grievances. Edward Azar, for instance, has argued that civil wars generally arise out of communal groups' collective struggle "for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. Other analysts have found political factors arising from weak state capacity to the denial of human needs, as central to many contemporary conflicts, in conjunction with economic motives. Such theorists suggest that sustainable peace requires addressing underlying grievances through direct engagement with the state. However rather than just grievances, the root cause of the grievance which is often the denial of human rights should be analysed as the reason for conflicts.

A second subset of grievances theorists focus on identity-based conflict as the salient catalyst of armed conflicts since the 1980s. Terming it as an acute "ethnic security dilemma," scholars like Ted Gurr, Woodward and Marshall, see ethnic and religious competition as the focal point of civil war in the post Cold War era. Drawing upon the Political Instability Task Force Data, these scholars suggest that ethnic wars are likely to occur when the state actively and systematically discriminates against one or more in the following:

- 1) larger countries with medium to high ethnic diversity;
- 2) when the country is a partial democracy with factionalism;
- 3) when the country's neighbors are already embroiled in a civil war or ethnic conflict;
- 4) when a country has experienced an ethnic conflict or genocide in the previous 15 years;
- 5) when a country has a large youth population.

Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, stressed the threat from countries and culture that base their tradition on religious faith and dogma, identifying geopolitical fault-lines between "civilizations" as reasons behind social dissension. The West's 'next confrontation', is going to come from the Muslim world, traced Huntington. "It is the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin. "We are facing," said Bernard Lewis, "a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present and the world-wide expansion of both" These theories however are based on a racists ideology. Because civilizations do not go to war with each other, but countries do. Also countries go to war because of specific

reasons that may be territorial, ideological, imperial etc. Thus both Huntington and Lewis have flawed ideas based on an ideology of Western supremacy and phobia against Islam.

However, most scholars find this 'ethnic security dilemma' issue problematic. According to them, ethnic dissention leading to armed conflict occurs only when:

- a) it is juxtaposed with high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources;
- b) When it is the result of elite manipulation whereby radical leaders exploit the insecurities felt by people in divided societies in situations of political volatility.

Yet another school of thought thinks that *relative deprivation* sparks political grievances and violent mobilisation, as economic inequality within a society, especially across distinct identity groups or communities foment armed conflict. These "horizontal inequalities" appear to be linked with conflict at moments of economic change, sometimes extending to armed confrontation. Conflicts could be initiated not only by the most deprived groups may initiate conflict, but also the relatively more privileged, who fear the loss of their position. Researchers at the Center on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at the University of Oxford found that horizontal inequalities are more likely to provoke conflict when inequalities are sustained and prolonged over time, boundaries between different identity groups are relatively impermeable, there are fairly large numbers in the different groups, horizontal inequalities are consistent across dimensions, where aggregate incomes slacken down and new leaders are not co-opted into the ruling system and the government is not responsive to social grievances.

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### 6.3 STATE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

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In South Asia, the post-colonial state appears to be especially vulnerable to crisis and internal conflicts often related to the vagaries of their colonial legacy; arbitrary territorial borders; insecure ethnic, religious or national minorities; and post-independence nationalist and sub nationalist movements that deepen rather than transcend divisions. A unique argument here centres on the Weberian assumption that the state monopolises the legitimate use of violence- however such legitimacy maybe understood. Violence in other words becomes a form of politics by other means.

According to Varun Sahni and Tharu, in South Asia, no matter how we define or classify subversive or secessionist groups, the state responds in a similar manner to all of them; in most cases it calls in the military. Faced with a perceived threat to its sovereignty, the state knows only how to respond with force. Only when the military strength of the insurgent group is defeated or considerably weakened does the state begin to negotiate or consider non-violent approaches. The small number of cases of armed insurgencies that ended with negotiated settlement before military defeat—the Mizos, Gorkhas, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, are testament to this argument. The authors weigh in the variation in the quantum of force used by the state and conclude that in dealing with violent insurgencies, while both democratic and non-democratic governments respond with force, and all cases of successful negotiated settlement have involved democratic governments. Democratic states are more likely to "end the cycle of violence," Sahni and Tharu argue, but at the same time democratic states also use the force they possess.

Two case studies explain the above statement- Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as brief recapture of their history shows. **Sri Lanka** attained universal suffrage in 1931 and the island

gained independence from its British colonisers in 1948. Soon after independence, the island's political structure enabled particularistic and ethnic-based groups to hold sway—leading to its triumph over interethnic and minority groups. The Indian Tamils, who came here as indentured labourers were the worst victims of Sinhala 'majoritarian radicalism.' Their systematic 'exclusion' first came to the forefront in the form of the *Swabasha* Movement that made Sinhala the sole national language replacing English (as the Tamil were well-versed in English and held important government posts) as the country's official dialect.

The Sinhala-only Bill was passed on 5 June, 1956. This led to widespread protest by the Tamils who wanted equal representation of their respective languages. The Tamils gathered outside the Parliament to non-violently fast and meditate. The Sinhala Language Protection Council attacked the Tamils and soon their violence killed around 150 Tamil minorities. Around this time, the minister of transport issued a directive calling for the Sinhala '*sri*' to be included on all vehicle number plates. When the Tamils started replacing the Sinhala '*sri*' with the Tamil '*shri*', many Sinhalese protested by smearing tar over Tamil lettering on buses, public buildings and street signs (P Sahadevan and Neil Devotta, 2006).

The majority Sinhala State used various methods to exclude the minority Tamils, that led to the exclusion and marginalization of the Tamil minority. They worked on the principle of a majoritarian state. However they were soon to realize that a democracy is not just based on majority rights. The minorities must be protected and given right in a real democracy. But the Sri Lankan state policies for higher education were designed to lower the number of Tamil students gaining access to higher education. Policies were implemented to ensure that the government hired only Sinhalese for the civil service. Post 1977—the Jayawardene's government resorted to national security legislation and harsh practices to silence its critics and rein amid a growing Tamil rebellion movement. The government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 which retaliated against Tamil insurgency. Cases of rape, tortured and murder of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan military were reported. Successive governments in Sri Lanka (except Chandrika Kumaratunga's regime) have used the Tamil issue as a trump-card to a) intimidate, harass and murder opponents who ever spoke otherwise, and b) as a powerful weapon to continue in power in the centre.

Post-1983, the Kumaratunga regime took some bold steps to bring the Tamils closer to her government. She tried to draw a distinction between the Tamil people and the militant group. War was declared as "against the enemies of peace" and not against the people. She partially lifted the economic embargo, offered a rehabilitation and reconstruction package worth Rs 40 billion to the Tamil populated North-East as a goodwill gesture. Restoration of supply of electricity to Jaffna and reconstruction of the Jaffna Library were also offered. The government proposed to supply food, clothes, medicines and other essentials to the people affected by war. A Human Rights Commission was set up by an act of Parliament in July 1996, while the armed forces were given strict instructions to spare the civilians from their attacks. In a bid to restore the democratic process and grass-roots level administration in the war-torn Jaffna peninsula, the government held civic elections in 1998. However, Chandrika Kumaratunga's peace initiatives were only short-lived. The peace process dwindled due to several reasons (P Sahadevan and Neil Devotta 2006). First, there had been steady efforts on the part of the government to dilute the original peace proposals under pressure from the Sinhala hard-liners. Second, the long-drawn-out delay in giving constitutional status to the proposals due to lack of

consensus among the Sinhalese, eroded the Sri Lankan Tamil faith in the proposed constitutional exercise. Third, the continuation of war, persistence of misery, hardship of the people in the North-East after re-imposition of the economic embargo failed to alter the view of the Tamils in favour of the government. The people's continued to rely on the LTTE and the LTTE developed as a strong a dictatorial insurgency force.

Started in 1972 as the 'Tamils New Tigers,' and later renamed as the 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam' (LTTE) the outfit spearheaded militancy for 37 years, occasionally pausing for peace talks but single-handedly pursuing its goal of a separate state. In its *Eelam* War, the guerilla fighters acquired conventional military capability, building a loyal network of Tamil cadre—the Black Tigers—whose deadly suicide terror attacks made the LTTE one of the most gruesome guerilla fighters in the world. Vellupillai Prabhakaran, its leader, was the product of a generation that felt Tamil rights and equality could not be obtained through moderate politics and **Gandhian** methods. Based on the level of use of violence and the duration of fighting, LTTE's 'war for Tamil *Eelam*' highlighted all the traits of a *total* war, encompassing:

- Intense regular fighting;
- Heavy deployment of forces (above a level of 50,000 men) and use of sophisticated weapons (tanks, artillery, helicopter gun-ships);
- A higher level of battle-related deaths (more than 1,000 people per year);
- Large-scale displacement of people and refugees (over 20,000 people per year);
- Extensive damage to property and economic infrastructure.
- Militarist and masculinist ideology and no tolerance for dissent or moderation from within the Tamils.

The LTTE surge for supremacy was called the war-for-peace strategy and had several distinct phases: the first phase (1983-87) saw highly intense military confrontation between the insurgent groups and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) that led to the opening up of multiple war fronts. The SLA's counter-insurgency operations during this phase were to wrest control of territories from the LTTE and marginalise the Tigers militarily. The second phase (1987-90) of the war was solely between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the LTTE: the former with strength of about 70,000 troops supported by heavy tanks and artillery went to the island to implement the bilateral peace agreement signed in 1987. The IPKF, through its counter-insurgency operations, chased the Tigers out of the Jaffna peninsula to the Vavuniya and Mullaitivu jungles and hideouts in the east. But, the IPKF soon withdrew from the island following the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During 1990-94, LTTE entered the third phase of its war with the SLA. The Army regained its hold over the eastern region, while the Tigers, in order to maintain their control over the north, engaged in a series of set-piece battles and hit-and-run operations.

This was followed by the breakdown in any attempt to chalk a peaceful settlement to the dispute, the LTTE having entered its fourth phase of *Eelam* War in April 1995. The Tigers, by this time, shifted their headquarters to Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi and spread their sphere of influence in the east. The LTTE, by this time had also developed the Sea Tiger Wing—a daring guerilla Navy that played havoc with the Sri Lankan Navy. With territorial victory forming the core objective of both the rebel group and the government,

this phase of war continued till 2002 when the government and the LTTE signed a cease-fire agreement and held peace talks facilitated by Norway. Although Prabakaran had demonstrated strategic military capability, he appeared to have failed to analyse two warfront disadvantages: a) there was no factoring the impact of the defection of Karuna, his able military commander from Batticalao on the LTTE's overall military capability; b) the second was in misunderstanding the determination of the Sri Lankan political and military leadership to eliminate the LTTE thoroughly. Ultimately, in its last two phases, (2002-04; 2004-09) when the security forces launched their offensive in the north with huge numerical strength, the LTTE did not have the essential force to face the onslaught. Prabakaran failed to use his superior insurgency tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional warfare. By the beginning of the phase of Eelam War sixth, Prabakaran had lost all the 15,000 sq km of land he lorded over in the east and the north. The government, therefore, fulfilled the promise it has made in its election manifesto to eliminate LTTE terrorism at any cost. The military victory of Sri Lanka came with large scale human rights violations, reported by agencies of the United Nations, the international press and others. Many civilians lost their lives and thousands were displaced as emergency continued even after the victory. A Lessons Learnt Commission was set up but the Tamil minority remain largely without the rights that they struggled for.

Sri Lanka, as one of the oldest democracies among the Third world countries in Asia and Africa, finally pursued the LTTE fighters through the use of force {the government has been accused of engaging in extrajudicial killing, abduction, extortions and the use of child soldiers} to bring an end to one of the bloodiest civil wars in Asia. Brad Adams, Human Rights Watch, Asia director, rightly pointed out: "The government and the LTTE appear to be holding a perverse contest to determine who can show the least concern for civilian protection."

**Pakistan** is a country where the military has been used as the ultimate guarantor of the nation's territorial integrity and internal security. Islamabad's prolonged tryst with military autocratic rule has seen the role of the army as expanding from;

- Guardians of internal security to defenders of Pakistan's ideological frontiers- the Islamization process that picked-up under Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship took place on *two* levels: Internally, changes were instituted in the legal system, where sharia courts were established to try cases under Islamic law and second, Islamization was promoted through the print media, radio, television and mosques.
- Externally, this process was used as an instrument to propagate pan-Islamism that would free Pakistan and other Islamic countries from perceived Western and particularly American, cultural and political influence.
- Jihad, support for militancy and cross-border terrorism has become the cornerstone of such a staunch Islamization process (Hussain, 2007).

Despite ritual Pakistani denials, there is now global consensus that the Pakistani army establishment, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has led the country to the brink of disaster, by its patronage of these jihadi groups. Analysts have shown that three pre-dominantly Punjab-based sectarian Deobandi/Wahhabi outfits backed by the ISI—the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-Sahiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed- have joined the Taliban to wage jihad in Afghanistan and taken on Pakistan's army in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They have also waged wars on Shias, destroyed Shia mosques across the country, provoking strong protests from Iran. The majority Sufi-

oriented Bareilvi sect in Pakistan has had its leaders assassinated by these groups. Ominously, even the elite Defence Housing Authority in Karachi has seen the construction of 34 mosques, out of which 32, including the prominent Sultan Mosque, are under Taliban control.

According to Pakistan's foremost expert on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf adopted a "complex policy" of minimally satisfying American demands to act against the al-Qaeda, while giving the Taliban leadership and fighter's havens in Quetta and the tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. General Musharraf also signed six agreements, virtually surrendering to Taliban groups and abdicating the authority of the Pakistan state. Like Musharraf, his successor General Kayani has pretended he is ready to deal with extremism, while in actuality, retained the army's link with the Taliban for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and Punjabi groups like the Laskar-e-Taiba, to "bleed" India. These tactics have stifled democracy and democratic institutions within Pakistan as the military tries to influence and control policy making in several key arenas like internal and external security and foreign policy.

Pakistan has long acted as frontline state for US interests. The US occupation and war in Afghanistan and their wars against terrorism have been used by the Pakistan army to increase their own leverage internally. At the same time the Pakistani Army also uses a doctrine of strategic depth, whereby it uses jihadi groups to extend its interests in Afghanistan and India. The US that long ignored this policy realized this only after the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan. Since this episode the relations between the Pakistani and US armies have deteriorated. The Pakistani civilian government is also trying to control the army which acts like a state within a state. The Obama administration's clandestine drone attacks on Osama's Abbottabad hide-out, has further proved that a) the days of US-Pak bonhomie is already numbered; and b) that Pakistan is gradually adjusting to the reality of the country's asymmetric tryst with militant radicalism. All indications suggest that civil society across Pakistan has come to a standstill and the state is nearing a "virtual collapse".

India will have to face up to the reality of the growing radicalisation across its western frontier, rather than entertaining illusions that civil society or political parties in Pakistan have the ability or will, to take on the radicals.

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## **6.4 STATE VIOLENCE IN INDIA**

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A heterogeneous state fragmented by divisive claims of ethnicity, India is a unique case study where most of the theories on state violence seem to have conglomerated. On the one hand it has been viewed as the silent 'recipient country' of cross-border terrorism, while, on the other, in recent years, the state is seen as withdrawing more from delivering public goods and services to the people and failed to redistribute income more evenly. As a result, it has become more repressive in maintaining the supposed stability and integrity of the nation. While mere snapshots are available of the state's growing intolerance towards people's demand in places like Orissa, Chattisgarh or Jharkhand, the real battlegrounds of repression have reached its nadir in the peripheral locations of the north-east or far north (Behera, 2008).

Events on the insurgency front in India's Northeast have shown that rebel groups have often succeeded in neutralising the reverses faced by them by entering into deals with other insurgent groups, where their alliances often act as force multipliers, incapacitating



the state apparatus. In Manipur, for instance, there are about 30 insurgent groups, of which 17 are active. They levy taxes and run kangaroo courts. The government machinery functions from Imphal and from the district headquarters. Government officials seldom go to the districts and *tehsil* or sub-*tehsil* headquarters because of fear of insurgent groups. Law enforcing agencies are ineffective in interior areas due to the presence of large number of undergrounds. The interior areas are controlled by the insurgents. The insurgent groups are the government and they decree 'justice'. These groups are well connected with those in Nagaland, Tripura, Assam and the neighbouring states of Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar (as they are the major conduits for illegal supply in small arms, ammunition, drugs and fake currency).

Pure 'law and order' solutions to ethnic and minority problems has gone hand-in-hand with 'large concessions' in the form of liberal aids and quotas for the educated youths in North-East. Still, the Indian state seems to have found no ways of resolving these insurgencies or even withdrawing measures like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Unless and until it strives for holistic systemic change from the core, 'the carrot and stick' policy will just keep on adding to its already insurmountable problems. India's other big 'northern conundrum,' the Kashmir conflict looks almost impossibly intractable. To the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir, whose fundamental allegiance lies with India, the only legitimate unit of governance is India—including Kashmir. To the citizens whose basic identity is with Pakistan, the only legitimate unit of governance is Pakistan—including Kashmir. To the citizens fundamentally committed to the achievement of an independent Kashmir, the only legitimate unit of governance is yet a phantom state of Jammu and Kashmir fully independent of both India and Pakistan. India will have to work out a negotiated settlement for a resolution to the Kashmir problem within a creative framework of competing nationalist claims by looking at the past history and methods of its federal framework.

Of the other outstanding problems, India's post-1991 liberalisation policies has left the nation grappling with its ever widening gap between the rich and the poor and the gap between the privileged and the rest. In huge swathes of India, the most deprived people have fallen sway to radical ideology and have taken to violence. Such civil violence will increase in frequency and scope as more and more citizens fall prey to such disparity.

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## 6.5 AN OVERVIEW

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South Asia has been an area multiple types of political violence due to various reasons:

- 1) The structural positioning of borders in South Asia are relatively recent, often arbitrarily redrawn after the withdrawal of colonial empires; thus trampling the hopes and aspirations of many sons of the soil. Not surprisingly, border areas in South and Southeast Asia have been rife with secessionist and recidivist nationalist movements, both within and across state boundaries. Such anti-state contests have taken the form of ethnic and minority struggles for autonomy or been subsumed into low-intensity inter-state conflicts. Ironically, while the colonial masters failed the state, the state has failed the populace owing to short sighted policies and elitist policies that left the mass of people behind.
- 2) The decades long Cold-War, the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance in the 1980s and the very fact of colonialism, de-colonisation and diaspora have all similarly affected the

calculations and strategies of local political actors. Whatever their intended consequences, political actors have failed to adequately address the grievances of many sections of the people.

- 3) Ideational influences—for instance the much-vaunted transmission of radical ideas and literature to India and Southeast Asia, has succeeded in episodes of ‘brain-wash’ activity of young minds and their outright involvement in terrorist activities to kill innocent lives as they seek to capture state power through the use of force.
- 4) The process of rampant globalisation and instant ‘societal change’ that has resulted in self-alienation of ethno-linguistic groups, middle to lower income groups, finding it hard to adjust itself to widening gaps between the haves and the have-nots, more precisely the powerful privileged and the rest.

Outside Asia, even the future of U.S and the rest is being hotly debated. The National Intelligence Council, has projected that in 2025, “The US will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished.” According to Joseph.S. Nye, “for all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern “barbarians” and non-state actors. In an information-based world, power diffusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state with the best story may sometimes win (Nye, 2010).” Meanwhile, even as India and Asia are part of the emerging and influential countries in the international system they remain beset with internal conflicts and violence. There is an urgent need for non violent protest, negotiated settlements and sustainable development in a human security frame.

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## 6.6 SUMMARY

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Of all the forms of violence, state violence has been of much interest to researchers. As in other forms of violence, it too has multiple forms, perpetrators, victims and purposes. This category of political violence includes state and non-state actors; it may originate from internal or external sponsors; take forms that range from terrorism and guerilla warfare to sectarian violence, police actions, riots and assassinations. Violence is often used to generate publicity for a cause, besides attempting to inform, educate and rally masses. In South Asia, the examples of state violence are cited from Sri Lanka and Pakistan and in India. This violence takes varied forms from violation of rights to deprivation in terms of social and economic causes. Various factors have been identified for the perpetration of state violence and have been dealt with in the Unit.

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## 6.7 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

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1. What do you understand by state violence? What are the types and theories of state violence?
2. Analyse the situation of state violence in South Asia.
3. Discuss the extent of state violence in India.

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## SUGGESTED READINGS

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