
UNIT 1 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL SOCIETY

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Between 1750 and 1850 the term civil society emerged as the key concept in Western political thought. Till then, civil society (*koinônia*, *politikç*, *civilis*, *societç*, *civile*, *bürgerliche*, *Gesellschaft*, *Civill Society*, *societâ civile*) was used synonymously with that of the state (*polis*, *civitas*, *état*, *Staat*, *state*, *stato*). A member of the civil society was also expected to be a citizen of the state and under obligation to act in accordance with its laws and without harming other citizens. This perception remained dominant till the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain, France and Germany¹. The concern at this time is with the nature of civil society and the limits of state action. Civil society as a concept originated within liberalism with an attempt to undermine absolutism.

The concept was introduced into modern European political philosophy through the Latin translations of the Aristotelian Greek term, *politike koinonia*, which for Aristotle, is the ethical-political community of free and equal citizens in ruling and being ruled under a legally defined system of public procedures and shared values. According to Riedel (1975), the term has since come to refer to very different organisations of the sphere regulated by public law- city republics, estate politics, dualistic structures of prince and country, the society of orders within the absolutist state. However, the Aristotelian identification of the political and the civil was maintained until the eighteenth century. Civil society, as a concept, is part of the democratic revolution of the eighteenth century as a bulwark against the absolutism of the state. It reflects the new spirit of the Enlightenment espousing the cause of liberal individualism.

Aims and Objectives

This Unit would enable you to understand

- The concept and meaning of civil society
- The classical interpretation of civil society.

1.2 ARISTOTLE AND CLASSICAL NOTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The Greek view, as exemplified in Aristotle's (384-322 BC) writings, used the term *koinonia* that includes the notions of association, community and society, and there was no evidence of separate terms for each of these words. Aristotle's main concern, according to Runciman, is not 'between society and the State but between the private or familial and the political-cum-social'. However, in the context of developing a philosophy of what constitutes the political, Aristotle provides a series of distinctions that indicates the difference between political society and the society of citizens. Aristotle points out that a number of natural associations are formed for some good purpose and the highest of them all, is the state that has to be distinguished from the household which arises naturally out of a union of male and female for the satisfaction of daily needs. Within the household, there is a natural hierarchy of the husband over the wife and master over the slave. A cluster of households form a village and several villages together constitute the city-state that ensures economic and political independence.

The state comes into being for the sake of life but continues for the sake of good life. It is established as an ideological end of other associations. The state exists by nature since 'man by nature is a political animal', for human beings alone have perceptions of good and evil, just and unjust. 'A person who does not feel the need for a state is either an angel or a beast'. It is this commonality that makes possible for a household and a state. However, this unity between a household and the state does not imply that the two associations are equal, for the 'state has priority over the household and over any individual among us, as the 'whole must be prior to the part'. The household satisfies the basic needs and necessities while the state tries to secure good life. The quality of life within a state depends on those who constitute it and the ends they wish to pursue. Aristotle answers this question by defining a constitution not just as a form of government or a set of norms but as a way of life, as that determines the moral character of a state. He criticises Plato (428/7-347 BC) for conflating the household into a state and points out that household differs from a state in a fundamental sense. In the former, relationships are between the superior (husband and master) over the inferior (wife, children and slaves), whereas in the state, the relationship between the ruled and ruler is one of equality, a point that John Locke (1632-1704), the founder of liberalism, subsequently reiterates in his critique of political absolutism and patriarchal authority in the late seventeenth century. The state is a space for free men because women's domestic responsibilities do not give them time for political affairs. Thus, for Aristotle, a *polis* is an association of free and equal men bound together by friendship and a common search for justice secured in law.

1.3 POST-ARISTOTLE EVOLUTION

Aristotle also believes that it is only by balancing the oligarchic (principle of quality relating to exclusive category of birth, wealth, property, social position and education) with democratic (quantity or numbers, the claims of the mass of people) elements that the state could be stable and less susceptible to revolutions. By this logic he seeks to avoid the rule by the rich or the poor and sees the middle class as means in the societal balance. This middle class state, for Aristotle, is the polity and is the most stable state, reiterating Euripides' (480-06 BC) description of these states as the 'save states'. It fulfils two

important political ideals: equality and consensus. This ideal of a mixed constitution is reiterated by Polybius (203-120 BC), Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-74), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Adam Smith (1723-90) and the English classical economists and is embodied in the American Constitution of 1787.

In the post-Aristotelian phase, the Stoics developed a conception of world citizenship and the Roman Empire, unlike the Greeks, tried to unite all human beings under it. The development of Christianity snapped the unity that Aristotle emphasizes by separating the *polis* or *civitas* and the church of Ecclesia, creating in St. Augustine's (354-430) doctrine a dual citizenship of *civitas Dei* and *civitas terrna*. Christianity infuses social unity by appealing to a divinely inspired and commonly shared spiritual fellowship. Augustine, like Cicero, defines the *civitas* as a group of men joined in their agreement about the meaning of *ius* or right. However, for Cicero the Roman Republic is the expression of *ius*, for Augustine a community unified by the love of God or *civitas de* expresses *ius*. By this definition, only a Christian political community could be a true commonwealth, one that fully implements the indispensable requirement of justice.

The later Christian tradition, exemplified in Aquinas' writings, revives Aristotle's notion of political life in the *polis*, by viewing the state as not only natural and as the highest form of organisation, but also as existing within and subordinate to the general frame of divine direction of the world. The community and society is synonymous even in Aquinas just as it is in Aristotle. Alighieri Dante (1265-1321) makes a break with the old ideal of a unified Christian Commonwealth and substitutes a carefully balanced and complete dualism in which the State and the Church are independent of each other, but necessarily complementary. The ultimate political unit is no longer Christendom but a world State. In feudal society, there existed, in a narrow sense, a division of society into estates, communities and guilds but the traditional notions of community and society continue to refer to both the political society of the state as well as to the units within it.

1.4 EARLY MODERN NOTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY: FERGUSON AND SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT

The concept of civil society as distinct from the state emerges only with the disintegration of feudal societies. The distinction between a political community and the spiritual one came under sharp focus in the wake of religious strife unleashed by the Reformation that gave rise to Protestantism breaking the unity of Christianity itself. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) demonstrates that ecclesiastical power is not a form of rule, command or coercion but a form of teaching and persuasion. It could not claim power over the state, while on the contrary only through acts of state can religious doctrines acquire a political status. However, he still identifies political with the civil society. In contrast, Locke, reiterating Aristotle points out that the political community is not an extended family and political rule is not paternal. Both Hobbes and Locke interchange features of the existing civil society back into the state of nature in order to demonstrate the natural and rational grounds for establishing a social contract between the individual and a political authority.

The Emergence of the distinction between the political and the social

The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth centuries, after the Industrial and the French Revolutions, brought about another distinction between state and society. Society no longer means the fundamental union between human beings that the state establishes. Civil society emerges as a network of interaction and exchange formed by

individuals exercising the right to pursue the satisfaction of their particular needs in their own way. Charles-Louis Secondat Montesquieu (1689-1755) points out that commercialism cures human beings of their prejudices that conceal their true needs. Once human beings realise their true neediness they will discover their sense of 'humanity' which would supersede the previous religious, ethnic and national sectarianism. They will look with disgust at military exploits and risks of war once they understand the attraction of peaceful trade leading to overall prosperity. They will also begin to appreciate national diversity and individual singularity. Commerce brings about frugality, economy, moderation, work, prudence, tranquillity, order and rule and more importantly, the spirit of proper juridical remedies that will make a balance between outright robbery and neglect of one's interest for the sake of others.

David Hume (1711-76) considers interest rather than the contract as the factor that cements individual to the society. Adam Smith, like his contemporaries - Hume, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) and John Millar (1735-1801), accepts the advantages secured by commerce and mutual support as the bases for forming society. Not only self-interest but also development of emotions (in particular, Smith mentions sympathy), rational character and conflicts, which arise between individuals, have to be taken into consideration. Civil society is shaped not merely by material desire for exchange but also by contract which requires trust and justice. These thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment provide a new description of civil society, as the expanding material sphere of trade and manufacture, and make a break with the traditional conception of the economy and the political notion of civil society, as adhered to by the social contract thinkers. For them, the economy is no longer limited, as it is for Aristotle, to the household, but an essential element of the civil society and of the civilised society that benefits from trade and exchange, extension of the division of labour and the market. This idea is derived from the writings of Marsilius of Padua (1275/80-1342) for whom material tranquillity makes possible for the smooth interchange of economic and social benefits constituting the essence of peace in a political community. He traces the development from family to state as a result of growing specialisation and differentiation of activities, all aiming at a common end, namely the acquisition of those things necessary 'for life and even the good life'.

Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), within the general framework of the Scottish Enlightenment, provides the most succinct analysis of civil society. According to Ferguson, civil society is not a sphere of life that is distinct from the state; the two are in fact identical. 'A civil society is a kind of political order which protects and 'polishes' its mechanical and commercial arts, as well as its cultural achievements and sense of public spirit, by means of regular government, the rule of law and strong military defences' (1792, vol.1, 252). He considers modern division of law as corrupting public spirit, a view that unites him with the old tradition of civic humanism. The loss of public spirit defuses the citizens' suspicion of power and thus prepares the way for despotic government. The destruction of public spirit by civil society augments the ambit and power of the state and habituates its subjects to the civil order and tranquillity. Civil society also institutes a professional army increasing the dangers of formation of government by military force. However, Ferguson does not say how the corrupted citizens of civil society can get rid of corruption or even entrenched despotism. To the dilemma that modern civil society requires a sovereign centralized constitutional state, which together with commerce and manufacturing 'breaks the bands of society (Ibid, 218) and threatens civil liberties and capacity for independent associations of citizens thus undercutting the rationale for life in civil society, Ferguson proposes strengthening citizens' associations-

whether in juries, militias or in civil society at large. Echoing Aristotle, Ferguson points out that human beings act best when they are in social groups. 'Under the influence of the animated spirit of society' human life is the happiest and freest (Ibid, 30). Interestingly he presumes public spirited constitutional monarchy as the best. This formulation emphasises the different realms of the state and civil society, but the realms are complementary and not antagonistic. However, the subsequent formulation reflects a total negation of this formulation.

1.5 CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE IN OPPOSITION: PAINE

In the context of the modern evolution, Ferguson's formulation is the first phase whereas the second phase begins with Thomas Paine's (1737-1809) polemic against Edmund Burke (1729-97) in the *Rights of Man* (1791-2). Writing in the background of the American Revolution with its innovative principles, that of natural rights of man, popular sovereignty, right to resist unlawful government, and republican and federal political structure, Paine points out to the utmost need to restrict the power of the state in favour of civil society, as the state is a necessary evil while the civil society is unqualified good. The more perfect civil society is, the more it would regulate its own affairs leaving very little for government. With the exception of United States, according to Paine, states everywhere crush and barbarise their people. Despotism stifles individual initiative, support patriarchal forms of power within households and institute class divisions within society through excessive rates of taxation. Paine thinks that reduction of state power to a minimum would encourage the formation of an international confederation of nationally independent and peacefully interacting civil societies². This is the beginning of a new idea of 'a government being the best which governs the least'. The nationally sovereign state would be a mere elected manager and guarantor of 'universal peace, civilization and commerce' (1977, p.183). He is convinced that limited states guided by civil societies cemented by ties of reciprocal interests and mutual affection make it possible for global order and harmony. Civil society thrives on common interest which is more powerful than the positive law enacted and administered by governments. Individuals interact with others spontaneously enabling them to form interlocking self-sufficient social whole free from conflict and if states everywhere were built upon this natural social bases then the existing inequality, aggression and bondage among individuals and groups would disappear. A 'cordial union' (Ibid, 189) of civilised society would replace social divisions and political unrest.

Paine, pointing to the positive aspects of the American Revolution, repeatedly emphasizes the need for deliberately resisting excesses of state power, underlined by two related but quite different sets of arguments, resulting in conclusions different from that of Ferguson. In the first place, the principle of natural right and active consent of the governed guides a legitimate state. Individuals delegate power to the state held as trust, one that could be legitimately withdrawn at any time. No particular political group or institution has the right to bind and control how, and by whom, the world is to be governed, as all individuals are born equal and with equal natural rights. These rights are God-given and incline individuals to act freely and reasonably for their own comfort and happiness without injuring the natural rights of others. Natural rights measure the legitimacy of states and cannot be annihilated, transferred or divided and no generation can deny them to their heirs. This rights-based argument led Paine to insist that states are legitimate and civilised only when they are formed by the explicit consent of the individuals and when this active consent is formulated constitutionally and articulated continuously through parliamentary

and representatives' mechanisms. These governments have only duties and no rights towards their citizens. Government is the product of individual contracting with one another and is subject to its constitution which specify such matters as the duration of parliament, the frequency of elections, the mode of representation, the powers of the judiciary, the conditions under which war can be declared, and the levying and spending of public money. Government without a constitution is comparable to power without right: "A constitution ... is to a government, what the laws made afterwards by that government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only asks in conformity to the laws made: and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution".

1.6 CIVIL SOCIETY AS LIFE BREATH OF STATE: TOCQUEVILLE

According to Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59) the problem of state despotism is the new problem that confronts modern nations and this could be checkmated only by the growth and development of civil associations that lie beyond the control of state institutions. The plurality of civil associations is necessary for consolidating the democratic revolution. Civil associations, according to Tocqueville, are permanent open schools of public spirit within which citizens learn their rights and obligations, and press their claims and become familiar with others. He considers civil associations as arenas in which individuals can direct their attention to more than their selfish, narrow private and conflicting goals and also realise that they are dependent on one another and hence must work for cooperation. He acknowledges that central state institutions ensure the survival and coordination among civil associations but he also insists, like Hegel, that freedom and equality among individuals and groups depend upon preserving types of associations that nurture local freedoms and provide for the active expression of particular interests. He is categorical that right of association within civil society is inalienable. For democracy to flourish a pluralistic and self-organising civil society, independent of the state, is absolutely necessary. He observes "no legislator can destroy it without attacking the foundations of society itself" (1981, p.279). Tocqueville has a three part model that differentiates, although unsystematically, between a civil society of economic and cultural associations and public, a political society of local, provincial and national assemblies and the administrative apparatus of the state.

1.7 STATE AS UNIVERSAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY AS PARTICULAR: HEGEL

There is a popular belief that it is the German thinkers in general and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) in particular who had written extensively on the distinction between the civil society and state as the crucial organising principle of the modern world. Manfred Reidel observes that Hegel's notion of civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is innovative in political philosophy and is comparable to Bodin's concept of sovereignty and Rousseau's notion of the General Will: "Hegel drew together '*bürgerlich*' and '*Gesellschaft*' into one of the basic concepts of political philosophy. When viewed externally, this concept corresponds to the tradition of Aristotle's *koinónia politiké*. Bodin's Melancthon's or Wolff's *societas civilis*, and Kant's '*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*'. In fact, it presupposes, for its appearance, a thoroughgoing break with this tradition. To this extent, one may well say that before Hegel, the concept of civil society in the modern sense did not exist" (Reidel, 1975, vol.2, p.262).

Keane (1998, p.63) disagrees with this interpretation and points out that between 1750 and 1850 many British, French and German thinkers were concerned with the notion of civil society and the limits of state action. Early modern German discussion on the scope and power of the state, when viewed comparatively, was the least receptive to the democratic political implications of the new distinction between civil society and the state. This is because late eighteenth and nineteenth century historical development in Germany had certain peculiarities: 'the absence of a successful revolution from below; the belated construction (from above) of a viable nation-state framework; the slower development of commodity production and exchange; the weakness of parliamentary rule; a deeply rooted *Obrigkeitsstaat* tradition; and the fragility of a political culture of citizenship- expressed in the idea (that was in sharp variance with the British *citizen* and French *citoyen*) of the *Staatsbürger*, the passive subject whose egoism is restrained and liberty, property and spiritual identity guaranteed and defined from above through the state and its laws'.

Hegel stresses that the state proper and the civil society are two different things. Civil society embodies a 'system of needs' and totality of private individuals. With gradual freeing of the Third Estate, the civil society came to be regarded as bourgeois society; a society of private, free and equal individuals with property but without the domination of one group by another. Civil society, for Hegel, represents conflict of interests that can be resolved only by the state representing all interests of society. Hegel sees the civil society as crippling and in constant need of state supervision and control. Unlike Paine, Hegel does not consider the civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) as a natural condition of freedom but as a 'historically produced sphere of ethical life' that lies in between the simple patriarchal household and the universal state. It includes the market economy, social classes, corporations and institutions concerned with the administration of welfare and civil law. The creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern world (1976, p.339) and is made possible because it develops the 'system of needs'.

Hegel, reiterating Ferguson, points out that the bourgeois economy generates commodities that make a level of specialisation and mechanisation of human labour necessary, thus transforming the nature of human needs, which no longer remain natural and become social. There is no possibility of harmony within the civil society. Harmony derived from unadulterated love is possible only within a family. Relationships within civil society are tenuous and, at times, bordering on serious conflict due to class division leading to restlessness. Hegel recognises a variety of classes or class fragments- civil servants, landowners, peasantry, intellectuals, lawyers, doctors and clergymen but the moving principle of the civil society, is primarily in the *Bürgerstand*. Much of Hegel's analysis is similar to that of Ferguson. The class of burghers, in which Hegel includes the workers, also is defined by its selfish individualism. The burgher class depends on the corporations- municipal, trade, educational, religious, professional and other state-authorised forms of collective associations; is less public spirited than a self-serving bourgeois. Hegel agrees with Ferguson and Paine that the modern civil society is a complex system of transacting individuals, whose livelihoods, legal status and happiness are interwoven but it is this universal selfishness, and on this point, rejects Ferguson's trust in citizenship and Paine's belief in natural sociability, that turns the civil society into a 'blind and unstable field of economic competition among private non citizens'. Hence the civil society is unable to resolve its inherent conflicts and overcome particularity and can remain civil only, if ordered politically, by the state. The state may intervene in the society to remedy its injustices and inequalities- for instance, the domination of one or more classes by another, the pauperisation of whole groups or the establishment of oligarchies. It could also

intervene in order to protect and attenuate the universal interests of the people, one that state itself defines.

Keane (1988) points out that Hegel's analysis represents the third phase in the evolution of the concept of civil society. The Young Hegelians and Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-83) criticise this relationship between the state and civil society. In writings such as *On the Jewish Question*, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction* and *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Marx uses the term civil society to make a critique of Hegel and German Idealism. The term disappears in the later writings. For Marx, the civil society is the site of crass materialism, of modern property relations, the struggle of each against all, and egotism. Civil society, he stresses, arises from the destruction of medieval society. In the medieval society, the individual was part of different societies, such as guilds or estates, each of which had a political role and hence there was no need for a civil realm. With the breakdown of these partial societies, individual becomes all important thus giving an impetus to the rise of civil society. The old bonds were replaced by selfish needs of atomistic individuals, distinct and separate from one another and from the community. Law provides the links between individuals but it arises not from human will and dominates them by the threat of punishment. The fragmented and conflictual nature of civil society determines the nature of the modern state.

Antonio Gramsci (1871-1937) writes extensively on civil society and uses the term in a manner different from that of Marx. It is not simply a sphere of individual needs but of organisations that has the potential for rational self-regulation and freedom. While Marx stresses the separation between the state and civil society, for Gramsci, the two are inter-related. Civil society consists of private institutions like schools, churches, clubs, journals and parties which are instrumental in crystallising social and political consciousness and political society consists of public institutions like the government, courts, police and the army, the instruments of direct domination. It is in the civil society that the intellectuals play an important role by creating hegemony. If hegemony is successfully created by intellectuals then the ruling class rules by controlling the apparatus of civil society and if they fail then the rule is through coercion. Unlike Marx who places total emphasis on economic relations for Gramsci it is the superstructure that is important. The hegemony of the dominant class is exercised through the civil society, culturally and not through coercion. But this hegemony of the civil society does not exist equally in all societies. Writing about the former USSR, Gramsci observes "in Russia, the state was everything, civil society was primordial and galantines; in the West, there was a proper relationship between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earth works".

The concept of civil society reappears in the neo-Marxist critics- Kolakowski, Mlynar, Vajda, Michnik, Habermas, Lefort, Touraine, Bobbio, Weffort, Cardoso, and O'Donnell of socialist authoritarianism locating the conceptual origins of communist totalitarianism in the young Marx's demand to overcome the distinction between the state and civil society. The separation of civil society from the state makes a decisive break from the Graeco-Roman conception that regards civil society as bound up with the state. The unity between the particular and the general in Hegel's account of civil society and state is also rejected by August Marie Francois Comte (1798-1957), seeking to establish a separate discipline of sociology as positive science of society. Sociology analyses social dynamics

and social static with the first deliberating on general law of social development and the second, on the 'anatomy' of society and the mutual interaction between its constituents. Comte's view of interconnectedness of elements of the social system anticipates functionalism.

1.8 SUMMARY

Most conceptions on state accept the distinction between the state and civil society except for totalitarianism that arose in the first quarter of the twentieth century, that negates not only the distinction between state and society, but also between the private and the public and between the state and nation. Totalitarianism conflates nation in the state and makes the state the sole and complete expression of the nation. It subordinates the state to a party and a paternalistic leader. Philosophically, some ideologies like Marxism and Anarchism feel strongly that the state will ultimately wither away. Radical versions of liberalism, as in Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992), contend that society represents spontaneity while the state stands for coercion and hence its ambit ought to be reduced to the minimum.

There is popular but mistaken notion that hard economic facts of modernity, that of commodity production and exchange under capitalism, a view traceable to the writings of Marx and Friedrich Engels³ (1820-95), were influential in the development of the concept of civil society. A brief overview of the writings of thinkers, other than Marx and Engels reveal of their awareness of the importance of market competition, commodity production and exchange and the growth of the bourgeoisie, hostility to aristocracy and its inherited wealth, corrupt manner and political privileges, to the modernisation of the concept of civil society. These thinkers are profoundly aware of the heterogeneity and complexity of civil society and "rarely reduced the complex patterns of stratification, organization, conflicts and movements of civil society to the logic and contradictions of a mode of production-the emerging capitalist economy.... they usually noted the patterns of harmony or (potential) conflict between civil society's privately controlled commerce and manufacturing and its other organizations, including patriarchal households, churches, municipal governments, publishers, scientific and literary associations and such policing authorities as charitable relief organizations, schools and hospitals" (Keane 1988, p.64). The early thinkers on civil society were aware of the inequalities within capitalism and the possible losses of freedom that commodity production and exchange would bring out. Above all, they were profoundly sensitive to the dangers of concentration of political power. It was the fear of despotism, attenuated by the experiences of the French Revolution that made them think of ways and means of limiting state power and in strengthening civil society. This view originated when liberal individualism was consolidating itself and becoming an integral component of the modern political discourse. The modern democratic age comes of age first in the post fascist period and then in the post communist era with the roll back of the state leviathan and the triumph of civil society.

1.9 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. Explain the classical notion of civil society and what led to its breakdown.
2. Would it be right to say that the notion of civil society is distinctly modern?
3. What is civil society according to the early modern thinkers in general and Ferguson in particular?

4. Critically dissect Hegel's notion of civil society.
5. Compare and contrast Paine and Tocqueville on civil society.

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(Endnotes)

¹ Hume observes that 'liberty is the perfection of civil society, but still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence (1953, p.42). Rousseau also speaks in a similar vein: "Look into the motives which have induced men, once united by their common needs in a general society, to unite themselves still more intimately by means of civil societies (*sociétés civiles*): you will find no other motive than that of assuring the property, life and liberty of each member by the protection of all" (1763, p.15). Kant repeats the notion: 'the greatest problem facing the human species is that of establishing a civil society (*societas civilis*) in which freedom under external laws is combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words, of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution" (1975, p.39).

² Paine writes "some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other craves distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher' (1977).

³ Civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) comprises the entire material interaction among individuals at a particular evolutionary stage of the productive forces. ... The term 'civil society' emerged in the eighteenth century when property relations had already evolved from the community of antiquity and medieval times. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels, 1969, vol.3, p.36).