
UNIT 10 CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

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10.1 INTRODUCTION

Confidence building is a new approach in peace and conflict studies that emerged in the context of the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Due to the very nature of that conflict, progress towards any **form** of cooperation or agreement on any issue was often slow. Scholars sobered by the **terrible destructive** power of nuclear weapons began focusing on ways to avoid ever using such weapons. They focused on notions of 'deterrence' and 'mutual assured destruction' to ensure neither side would use **their nuclear** weapons for fear of terrible retaliation. Once this was achieved, they turned to **looking** at ways to reduce the **kinds** of tensions that might spark a nuclear exchange. Confidence building approach is an offshoot of these efforts.

Confidence building approach essentially seeks to evolve mechanisms for preventing conflict and aid the adversaries in moving from zero sum to cooperative positive sum relationships. The objective of these mechanisms or measures, popularly known as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is to reduce tension and suspicion, to reduce the risk of armed conflict, both as a consequence of an accident, and of miscalculation; to develop communication and co-operation to reduce the use of military power, and to increase mutual **understanding** on security issues and defence priorities of each party. By evolving mutual trust and understanding among adversaries, CBMs provide new opportunities for conflict resolution and building lasting peace.

Confidence-building measures can be military, diplomatic, cultural, or political. However, military and diplomatic measures are the most commonly used in building confidence among

parties involved in protracted conflict. Since CBMs have come to accentuate security aspects, they are also referred to as Confidence Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

Individual governments, non-state actors, or third parties such as the United Nations, regional organisations, or other states can initiate CBMs. Ardent advocates of this new approach believe that it is possible to codify CBMs into a process helping solve adversarial relationships between and within states and thus create conditions for lasting peace.

10.2 KEY ELEMENTS OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING

The key elements of confidence building approach evolved in the context of Cold War conflict that came to dominate international politics after the end of the World War II. Here, one can identify nine elements of the Cold War equation which could be said to mark the evolution of Confidence building approach in the theory and practice of international relations. These elements could be classified into batches of negative, positive and crisis management oriented ones which also underlines their evolution in that order.

In the early years of the Cold War, the negative (no commitments) oriented elements of confidence building in East-West adversarial equations became manifest in three different ways. Firstly, the fact that Soviet westward expansion at the end of World War II was successfully contained in Greece (1947) and Berlin (1948), was the first indicator during the Cold War that both sides had decided (or forced) to respect the status quo. This meant that superpowers would not use their unlimited power to alter the political map of the world and eschew escalation to ensure stability in their equations. It was this decision to accept the status quo that resulted in Korea and Germany staying divided. The political changes on global map were thereafter kept to minimum and at the periphery.

Secondly, eschewing of escalation to nuclear weapons use and brinkmanship had witnessed the confinement of hostile responses to conventional military provocations like the U-2 incidents when an American spy plane was shot down by the Soviets during 1960. The two sides were also to ensure that never in future such military provocations were repeated. Indeed, in the end this stream of thinking was to lead to the signing of several agreements and treaties. Since neither side had developed sufficient trust to allow inspectors on their soil, these early agreements were designed to monitor compliance through non-intrusive verification methods. For instance, the Incidents at Sea agreement of 1972 aimed at reducing the many incidents at sea (movements and manoeuvres of aircraft carriers, ships and submarines) that might escalate to war. Here, the two sides agreed to sort out military-to-military level difficulties and problems by organising annual meetings of the top admirals on both sides. Such efforts to avoid military provocations through confidence building agreements was to eventually pave way for a series of arms control and disarmament agreements, starting from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty of 1972 and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I).

Thirdly, following their experience of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both sides agreed that nuclear brinkmanship was too dangerous a strategy to be repeated. Once missiles were mutually removed from Cuba and Turkey, such nuclear brinkmanship was completely avoided. All this was nothing but building pillars of mutual confidence and this appreciation

of confidence building approach was to lead to two sides further into taking more positive initiatives in strengthening it.

Working on this base of negative mutual confidence building, there were several new initiatives that could be regarded as a set of positive elements of Cold War confidence building. Firstly, with focus on confidence building, both Moscow and Washington were to now make it a routine to put 'advance notice' clauses providing for notice of oncoming force improvements etc. into their future agreements, as also to sign fresh agreements – like the Seabed Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 – on issues that had no relationship whatsoever with their immediate national security. These agreements had a symbolic value in mutual confidence building and in facilitating stability. Secondly, having **codified** some of these CBMs, 'verification' emerged as central defining feature of most of new treaties and regimes. During early 1980s, President Reagan was to repeatedly cite the Russian caution "trust, but verify" to justify need for such verification regimes in each treaty. These were to be followed by new innovative **verification** instruments like 'on-site', 'challenge' 'intrusive' inspections by outside experts. Thirdly, once some of these norms, institutions and processes were **codified**, the two sides began focusing on "faithful implementation" of these provisions. Indeed, "unilateral initiatives" were to gradually become stronger key elements of such confidence building. Especially, Gorbachev's new thinking during mid-1980s was to become the symbol of unilateral efforts at mutual confidence building.

Even as the positive sets of elements of confidence building were taking shape, the two sides of the Cold War divide began focussing on Crisis Management, which was to become integral to confidence building approach. Here the two sides established new trends. Firstly, communications were to emerge as the most critical core of CBMs. Starting from East-West 'hotline' that was established following the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, this was to evolve into a whole lot of other channels of communications including "meetings on the sidelines" of major conference to "summit" meetings, and other regular interactions of top **leadership**; all aimed at building mutual confidence. Secondly, both sides were to emphasise and work towards a fail-safe command and control centres for their nuclear weapons and missiles. This was to guarantee mutual safety **against** accidental or unauthorised attacks which could not be denied as a possibility. This was to later expand into building of common technical centres **which** were to cater to both sides and focus on building **data**-collection and for consultations. Finally, both sides of the East-West divide were to demonstrate how they were not ever satisfied with the existing CBMs and had to continuously explore new possibilities. This is because conflict evolves **continuously**; **while** new institutions and channels for building confidence were being evolved, the old ones had to be reviewed constantly. This was to ensure that confidence building approach is able to keep pace with its future challenges.

10.3 THREE PARALLEL PROCESSES IN EUROPE


In addition **to** these general broad trends that promoted this confidence building approach as driven by the power equations of two superpowers and their allies, a more serious 'theoretical evolution of this approach was to happen in European theatre where the focus was far more generic and long term. These efforts were to flow from regular meetings of independent think-tanks and experts at several places though three of these – Stockholm, Helsinki, and Vienna – were to become **particularly** known centres for their pioneering

activities towards evolving a whole set of **CBMs** practices. Several of these norms were to be **codified** by them and this was to become part of European life and **thinking**. Many of these models were to be later replicated in other conflict-ridden theatres. These were to also stimulate parallel debates in other regions and generate similar as also alternate **thinking** on Confidence Building approach in international relations.

10.3.1 The Helsinki Process

The long-drawn process of Helsinki discussions amongst experts and officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) countries were to finally produce the Helsinki Act of 1975. To begin with **this** effort focused on Arms Control negotiations and implementation, a most engaging issue in Europe of the 1970s. Besides, these negotiations were to focus on **achieving** recognition of **status quo** and to promote interactions between the two sides of the Cold War divide. For this purpose, these **initiatives** were to be particularly premised on the two salient features of European politics **i.e.** (a) relatively secure and defined inter-state borders and (b) a whole established network of legal institutions and faith in their working. These efforts and the Helsinki Act were to completely change the way problems had been viewed amongst European countries. And CSCE was to become a platform for ensuring the effectiveness of confidence building approach in the conduct of inter state ties in Europe.

10.3.2 The Stockholm Accord

 The Stockholm Accord of 1986 was an initiative by the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Being part of arms control exercise, it was known for its focus on security establishments and for its innovations like 'on-site' inspections, military 'observers' and for propounding **submission** of 'annual calendar' of **military** exercises which were the main agenda of its negotiations. Later Stockholm discussions were to further expand themselves into evolving a network for "cooperative aerial inspections" which finally led to the 'Open Skies' agreement allowing mutual inspections of military facilities of Warsaw Treaty **Organisation** (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the military symbols of East-West divide. This eventually led to the establishment of a Crisis Prevention Centre at Vienna (Austria) which was to become a unique example of confidence building success.

10.3.3 The Vienna Document

The Vienna Document of **1990** was to further expand the network of data collection and data exchange amongst adversaries as a method for building mutual confidence. The Vienna discussions were to focus particularly on areas like: (a) force deployments, (b) new weapons programmes, and (c) defence expenditures. Information on these could be submitted and made available to countries and to confidence building analysts. The subsequent Vienna Agreement of 1992 was to highlight the **importance** of "transparency" especially in areas of new weapons programmes asking **parties** to demonstrate the potential of their new weapons which itself was seen as effort toward promoting confidence building amongst **adversaries**. This was also the time when success of Confidence Building approach in **Europe** had begun to attract attention in other theatres, especially in **conflict-ridden** parts of Asia.

10.4 ASIAN AND EUROPEAN MODEL-BUILDING

Indeed, similar arrangements had for **long** been experimented amongst various **Asian** nations. If anything, the CBMs approach in the Asian context had preceded all Western models. Therefore, ideas of CBMs in Asia are neither fully borrowed from Europe nor identical to those outlined in European models. Indeed, experience shows that Asia has had its own traditions on building inter-state confidence as also how these European models have encountered severe limitations when superimposed in Asian situations.

To take examples from India's own experience the whole Gandhian approach to national liberation was based on achieving transfer of power peacefully and not turning British into India's enemy. More specifically, beginning from the Joint Defence Council of 1948 that effected the division of assets and armed forces between India and Pakistan to the **Sino-Indian** Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, and later the **Indo-Pak** Simla agreement of 1971, various formal **and informal** agreements had already been reached incorporating these CBMs into India's foreign and security policy-making. Indeed, the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Panchsheel) initiated by India and China remain the most enduring in ensuring stability and peace in international relations.

In their actual practice as well, tacit agreements on issues like those on non-use against civilian targets, or the selective use of armed forces between India and Pakistan have been by far most effective CBMs than the codified documents and other mechanism that have been put in place for ensuring peace in this **turmoil** ridden relationship. Of course, the idea of CBMs in Asia had no traditions of institutionalising, especially no tradition of model building which has been very European and legalistic and rigid. **Asian** CBMs remain far too broad-based and informal where personalities and not institutions remain more effective. **This** may be also a limitation on the CBMs effectiveness.

The following are, in short, some of the more salient distinctions of Asian CBMs especially when these are compared to Western models. Firstly, the condition of having a subjective feeling of an imminent threat, which is so central to all those Western conceptions of CBMs, is not always met with the same degree of intensity and accuracy in similar Asian situations. In Asia's rather a loose polycentric situation, nations had never been as clearly divided, as were the communist and liberal democracies that was characteristic of the Cold War divide. Secondly, the basic condition of broad equality of the military capabilities between the potential parties to the conflict, again **seems** a very much a **Eurocentric** feature of CBMs. This has been generally missing in Asian situations of crisis. China, India and Pakistan can themselves be cited as ideal examples of this asymmetry of power which gets circumscribed **or** multiplied given the nature of political and strategic cultures and systems of each of these countries. Thirdly, the inter-state boundaries, which form the basic element of European CBMs, are themselves a major problem and therefore the **very** objective towards which most Asian **CSBMs** seek to provide solution. **Also**, Asian **CSBMs** are generally backed by ever widening network of measures like State sponsored people-to-people contacts which are aimed at expanding **mutual** trust and understanding between the entire social elite on both sides.

Therefore, this myth about the Asian CBMs being the by-product of European models does not stand the scrutiny. Indeed, the **global** factors have **surely been far more influential**

in moulding the European CBMs than those amongst Asian countries. This is simply because unlike Europe (a) the conflicts in Asia were never seen to be vital to the national interests of both the superpowers; and, (b) the middle ranking powers like China and India had become increasingly independent from the regimented bipolar world order of Cold War years.

10.5 INDIAN EXPERIENCE

Firstly, to outline the evolution of CBMs in India-China ties, the efforts of the two parties' could be divided to two distinct phases, those before the 1962 war and those since the war when the two Asian giants were engaged in some kind of a cold war conflict. As regards Pakistan, it had been part of India until the violent partition that left a permanent scar on both sides thus making them each other's number one adversary. Accordingly, the Indo-Pak initiatives for CBMs seem to be far more continuous though slow as also far more in number compared to the China-India CBMs. Nevertheless, given the nature of their equations, the China-India CBMs have been far more effective in controlling the violent expressions of their conflict. By comparison, therefore, Sino-Indian CBMs have created as also evolved in a far more positive environment which distinguishes them not only from the European experience but, to a certain extent, from the evolution of Indo-Pak CBMs

10.5.1 India-Pakistan CBMs

Before charting the course of major Indo-Pak initiatives in the evolution of their CBMs, it would be perhaps worthwhile to first understand the specific nature of both Indo-Pak conflicts as also the Indo-Pak CBMs. And here, apart from looking at them in terms of the general character of the South Asian CBMs, it is perhaps important to underline some of the essential differences between Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak CBMs. This is perhaps important for defining the essential character of Indo-Pak CBMs.

Firstly, compared to the Sino-Indian competition as also the process of their CBMs, the competition and CBMs between India and Pakistan have always had far more visibility; often presenting themselves as emotional outbursts of their public sentiment, be it positive or negative. This, however, does not mean that Indo-Pak CBMs have been any more effective than the case of Sino-Indian CBMs.

Secondly, Indo-Pak military engagements and threat perception have been far more regular and real and, therefore, are of far greater compelling factor in the evolution of Indo-Pak CBMs while the Sino-Indian CBMs have emerged more out of gradual rapprochement and mutual understanding. Accordingly, despite low-profile initiatives, the Sino-Indian CBMs have been far more effective than the numerous but blurred Indo-Pak CBMs.

Thirdly, in Indo-Pak initiatives, CBMs have been more often used to camouflage competition. Initiatives for accelerating competition or for evolving CBMs have, therefore, coincided and overlapped far more sharply in Indo-Pak ties than in Sino-Indian ties. The most recent case in point can be that of Pakistani intrusions in the Kargil sector of India's Jammu & Kashmir state that were taking place in the very background of Lahore summit of February 1999.

And finally, the most important factor to be kept in mind while examining the Indo-Pak CBMs remains their historical legacies of partition of India and later the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of a new state of Bangladesh with India's active encouragement. This not only completely transformed the strategic equations of the South Asian subcontinent but placed Indo-Pak inter-state competition in a totally different context.

As regards India's CBMs with erstwhile united Pakistan, these resemble less the Indo-Pak CBMs coming after the 1970s India's CBMs with other South Asian neighbours which have also felt vulnerable to similar tensions and suspicion about India's size and prowess, have also been of lesser importance than are Indo-Pak CBMs. Despite the fact that all these other smaller South Asian states share similar problems about disputed borders, overlapping ethnic, religious and cultural affinity with India, the erection of CBMs with them has been a relatively easy task than the task of building CBMs with Pakistan. Given their historical legacies, mutual suspicions in Indo-Pak interactions have been far more deep compared to India's other neighbours. Accordingly, India has been far more successful in evolving CBMs even with these smaller South Asian states than with either Beijing or Islamabad. Pakistan has obviously been by far the most difficult country to deal with in this regard. To cite the most basic difference in their approach to resolving disputes, while India has tried to sort out difficulties at bilateral level, Islamabad has repeatedly tried to internationalise Indo-Pak problems. Similarly, while India has been extremely sensitive to the Sino-Pak ties-especially of China's alleged involvement in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes-this factor has been completely overlooked by most of the policy makers amongst the Pakistani power elite.

As regards the track record of Indo-Pak initiatives, despite the fact that the very idea of Pakistan had found negative response from some quarters of the Indian power elite and that the two have since fought four wars, the evolution of Indo-Pak CBMs was greatly facilitated by the very fact of the largely peaceful transition of power from the British. Secondly, the Indian National Congress leadership's acceptance to ensure a smooth partition of India into two dominion states had also created avenues for Indo-Pak positive interactions at least after some time. In fact, the first example of Indo-Pak CBMs was in-built in the very working of the Joint Defence Council during 1946-48 itself as it tried to partition stores, equipment and manpower of British Indian armed forces as also its other economic assets between the two dominions of India and Pakistan. Even during their first war in 1948, there are a number of examples how mutual chemistry of field commanders from both sides (who had worked together until 1947) often helped in sorting out matters and restraining further violent actions from both sides.

This, in a way, laid the very foundations of the entire track of Indo-Pak CBMs that witnessed a series of agreements and understandings on various occasions. However, even when the two sides agreed on numerous CBMs, which included withdrawal of troops to peace time position, demarcating their Line of Control (LoC) as also the historic Tashkent and Simla Agreements, their political baggage of a violent partition had continued to undermine their positive initiatives through CBMs. In the absence of mutual trust and understanding, a whole pile of written agreements have continued to be vulnerable to subjective interpretations and non-implementation. Nevertheless, the two have managed to put in place some of the most critical CBMs like their agreements on (a) Prohibition on Attack against Each Other's Nuclear Installations, (b) Advance Notice on Military Exercises,

and (c) operating a 'hotline' telephone contact between two prime ministers, while their fledgling Foreign Secretary level talks have also evolved into a major link for negotiations. For various reasons, however, the success of these measures in controlling Indo-Pak conflicts remains as limited as ever.

In the evolution of Indo-Pak military CBMs, it should be noted that the initiatives have received a boost since the late 1980s. At least from the Indian perspective, this heightened consciousness has come about, at least partly and paradoxically due to the deepening of the Sino-Pak ties and the resultant success of the Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes as also due to Pakistan's continued low-intensity war in India's Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir states. Even in the conventional sense of inter-state military competition, this period has witnessed some striking expressions of military muscles flexing in terms of major military exercises, like India's Brasstacks and Pakistan's Zer-be-momin. Added to this, Pakistan has also resorted to a low-intensity covert war. This has proved very expensive for the Indian side though Pakistan has not obtained any substantive success in its strategic objectives either. All this has received tremendous attention in Western media reports and analyses and Indo-Pak competition has since attracted the attention of various Western non-governmental and governmental organisations. According to Western commentators, these two countries repeatedly came closer to an open war with their crisis during 1991 and 1999 allegedly involving the possibilities of a nuclear exchange.

This heightened paranoia about a perceived Indo-Pak competition has given a new boost to Track-II diplomacy between these two countries which has picked up momentum since early 1990s. These Track-II dialogues have provided a second line of communication between conflicting power elite and sought to bridge the gap between official positions by serving as testing grounds for new policy initiatives. The example of what could be achieved by these Track-II activities was recently demonstrated by the no-longer-secret bilateral talks between two prime ministers through their special emissaries Niaz Naik and R.K. Misra who had already carried out eleven rounds of talks and reportedly "very near" to a historic solution on Kashmir when this process was undermined by Pakistan's fourth military coup on October 12, 1999. Thus, in the end, though these Indo-Pak initiatives towards evolving CBMs have enhanced mutual understanding and transparency between these two countries yet, they remain dependent on the political will and bold individual initiatives by charismatic leaders and, therefore, the debate on the level of their effectiveness in restraining their inter-state competition remains as inconclusive as ever.

10.5.2 India-China CBMs

To recall the first phase of Sino-Indian CBMs, soon after China's October revolution in 1949, India was the first non-communist and fourth Asian country to recognise Mao's communist regime and establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. India had also supported Beijing's permanent membership at the UN Security Council despite hints from the United States that they could consider New Delhi to replace China in the Security Council. However, rather than falling prey to American enticements, India surrendered all its military and administrative presence in Tibet and recognised Tibet as autonomous region of the Chinese Republic to demonstrate its good will towards new China. This was done under the Panchsheel agreement of April 29, 1954 that was signed in Beijing after months of negotiations. Since all these initiatives were geared towards controlling possibilities of Sino-

Indian misunderstanding and confrontation, their character was essentially the same as those of the later **European** CBMs. It is believed that these concessions were extended in view of **the bigger** deal on the boundary question that had been agreed between **Nehru** and Zhou **En-lai**. This expectation was thwarted by the China-India war of 1962 and it took a long time for the two countries to resume negotiations seriously. Though they revived diplomatic ties in 1976, it was only in the later half of the 1980s that there was a significant improvement in their relations, ironically, after border tensions. In 1986, after the Indian troops patrolling the Line of Actual Control briefly occupied **Samdurang Chu**, a valley in the eastern sector of the disputed border, Chinese troops established permanent base there. India and China accused each other of intrusion. This incident seemed to have convinced the Indian leadership that the border problem should not be handled through military **means**. **The** then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, attempted a diplomatic breakthrough by visiting China. Following this, a series of visits between Indian and Chinese leaders and cultural exchanges took place. These eventually paved way for the signing of two major **CBMs agreements** which have been extremely effective in ensuring peace and tranquillity on their disputed borders.

First CBMs Agreement 1993

Signed in Beijing between **Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao** and Premier Li Peng on September 7, 1993, the "Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control" (henceforth **AMPT**) was hailed as the first major conventional **arms** control agreement between two Asian countries without any third party mediation of any kind. It was the first of its **kind** since their Panchsheel agreement of April 1954. As a result, it begins by reiterating faith in Panchsheel and asserts that these should be the basis of all the inter-state relations. But, far from their earlier Panchsheel agreement, where only India made major concessions, this one remains premised on the **principle** of '**accommodation**' and 'mutual and equal' benefit for both sides and outlines specific CBMs that should further buttress China-India understanding and mutual **confidence**.

Article One of the AMPT starts by highlighting the consensus to resolve the boundary question "through peaceful and friendly consultations" and both sides undertake to "strictly respect and observe the line of actual control" and never to "use or threaten to use force" and, whenever necessary "**jointly** check and determine the segments" of their borders. Article Two strengthens this obligation by asking the two sides to keep their border military presence "to a minimum level compatible with the **friendly** and **good-neighbourly** relations" and to further "reduce" these troops "**in conformity** with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security." Taking from here, Article Three talks of evolving "**effective** CBMs" and to not to "**undertake** specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones" and to "give the other notification of military exercises" along border areas. Then, Articles Four and Five speak about their agreement to create mechanisms for dealing with intrusions and other exigencies. In Article Six, both sides declare that despite these resolutions nothing in this treaty shall "prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question." Thus, their main dispute, though formally acknowledged, is not made to stand in the way of promoting CBMs.

To **kick-off** future initiatives Article Seven asks **both** sides to start by specifically defining the "form, method, **scale** and content of effective verification measures", and Article Eight

initiates this process by **asking** each side to "appoint diplomats and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present agreement". The setting up of an Expert Group **under this** clause can be easily described as the greatest achievement of this pact in **institutionalising** China-India CBMs. Comprising officials from Ministries of Defence, Interior, External Affairs and Survey of India, this group has since come to be the most regular and dedicated channel negotiating border demarcation and other associated problems.

Second CBMs Agreement 1996

This twelve-article agreement on CBMs was signed during President Jiang Zemin's November 1996 visit to New Delhi which was also hailed as unique and significant. Amongst new initiatives, this remains geared to further extend their existing CBMs to more specific and sensitive areas in the military sector. Its first Article that reads, "Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side", makes it a No War pact, in effect, and both sides have since projected it in that spirit. Once again, it affirms their commitment to LoAC (Article Two) while this time again fully recognising that both **have**, "**different** perceptions" on certain segments for which the two agree "to speed up process of clarification" and start "to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions... as soon as **possible**" (Article Ten). This businesslike approach to sensitive questions reflects mutual confidence on both sides.

All these years there had been major confusion that China does not consider their deployments in Tibet for internal security as open for mutual reductions while India believes that Chinese forces on the Tibetan plateau had a clear one-to-ten advantage against Indian forces. To **clarify this misperception**, Article Three provides that keeping with "**the** principle of mutual and equal security" all future ceilings are expected to be based on "parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communications and other infrastructure and time taken to **induct/deinduct** troops and armaments." Article Four clearly categorises certain type of offensive weapons withdrawal, the process for which will receive priority. These include combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles". To start with the two sides will "exchange data on the military forces and armament" that are to be reduced. It **urges** the two to "avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one **division** (15,000 troops) in close proximity to the LoAC" and to inform each other on **type**, level, planned duration and areas of exercise" in case it involves more than a Brigade (5,000 troops) and about deinduction of forces "within five days of completion". The other side shall be free to seek any number of clarifications.

Taking a major step forward, the two agree that no combat aircraft which "include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, **armed** helicopter and other armed aircraft" shall be allowed to fly "within ten **kilometres**" of the LoAC "except by prior permission" from the other side (Article Five). Article Six prohibits any use of "hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives with two kilometres" of the LoAC unless it is "**part** of developmental activities" in which case the other side shall be informed "through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance." Then, to "strengthen exchanges and cooperation between their military

personnel and establishments", Article Seven provides that the two sides shall expand: (a) "meetings between their border representatives at designated places, (b) "telecommunication links" between these border points, and (c) to establish "step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities" of the two sides.

Should any land or air intrusions take place "because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters", the other side is expected under Article Eight to "extend all possible assistance to them" and the two shall exchange information and have consultations to work out "modalities of return of the concerned personnel." And finally, under Article Eleven, the China-India Joint Working Group on Boundary Question is exhorted to start "mutual consultations" for "detailed implementation measures", and under Article Nine each side has "the right to seek clarification" regarding the "manner in which the other side is observing the agreement" or on any "doubtful situation" in the border region.

10.6 HAVE CBMs BEEN EFFECTIVE?

In the first place, the answer to this question about the effectiveness of CBMs would depend on what one expects these CBMs to achieve. The CBMs are obviously not expected to resolve inter-state disputes or even to offer any lasting solution to their inter-state competition or conflicts. At best, the CBMs are expected to only underline the expressed desires of the parties involved in terms of a series of guidelines that would determine their code of conduct regarding a given dispute or disputes and regulate their inter-state competition as also to restraint possibilities of misperceptions resulting in taking mutually destructive violent actions. Accordingly, CBMs remain vulnerable to being breached by any one of the parties as and when it may be willing to risk the absence of such a framework or if it perceives that the framework has become irrelevant or detrimental to its national priorities. Therefore, the effectiveness of Southern Asian CBMs has to be measured in relations to the challenges that emerge in the future as also in view of available political will on the part of their power elite.


At the most visible level, it may be argued that since during these last 50 years India has had only one war with China- while it has had four wars with Pakistan -the China-India CBMs have been far more effective. This argument can also be reinforced by citing that China otherwise has not been any more peace-loving than Pakistan because during these last five decades, both China and Pakistan have been involved in four major conventional wars each though not with each other. But then this outcome has also to be seen in terms of their national priorities, their national capabilities and a variety of other variables which increase the complexity of undertaking any such comparative analysis. Therefore, it is perhaps easier to assess their effectiveness by comparing CBMs to the challenges that they have to deal with. And even here, given the net outcome of the Sino-Indian CBMs, it seems that these have generated tremendous mutual trust and understanding between the two countries and hence proved to be more successful.

More specifically, this effectiveness of Sino-Indian CBMs can be seen from the establishment and institutionalisation of CBMs between their militaries that represent perhaps the most conservative forces within their two societies. Looking at the CBMs between their two defence establishments, regular commanders meetings at four border points i.e. Bumla and Dichu (eastern sector), Lipulekh (central sector) and Shipki La (in western sector) perhaps

can be cited as the most successful example of how CBMs can control and guide inter-state competition at the most sensitive points. More recently, military commanders at **Nathu La** (in the eastern sector) have also operationalised 'hotline' telephone links to establish facts on the ground in case of exigencies. The other high point in these military CBMs had been the eighth round of Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings at New Delhi during August 1995 which had agreed to actually dismantle four border posts in the Wangdong region where troops had come to be deployed at alarming proximity to each other. That year the PLA Air Force delegation had also visited **Indian** Air bases. Similarly, during November 1993, the Chinese Navy ship, Zhang He, had paid a goodwill visit to Bombay which was the first visit of this kind in last 35 years when INS **Mysore** had visited Shanghai during 1958. The regular naval exercises have since become normal and regular exercise between two navies.

Trade, perhaps has since come to be the most visible symbol of India's **confidence** building. This has been described as the 'one most agreeable development constituting an effective pillar of India's confidence building with its adversaries. To give example of India-China and Pakistan again, the year 1994 remains very critical in confidence building. That year, India became China's largest trading partner amongst South Asian countries, crossing even its closest ally Pakistan. This provided tremendous boost to the proponents who prescribe CBMs for greater understanding in this region. India's trade with **Pakistan** still remains less effective though Indian goods have already evolved an important **constituency** inside Pakistani society. It is in this backdrop that one must view successive initiatives by the former Indian Prime Minister **Vajpayee** that aimed at building confidence vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. This is seen now as integral to building India's security and peace.

10.7 SUMMARY

The **term** CBMs entered the vocabulary of international relations only in the 1970s. As we observed, the objectives of CBMs is to translate certain principles of international law into positive actions so as to provide credibility to states affirmations of their peaceful intentions. Typically, they involve exchange of information and verification with respect to the use of military forces and armaments. Some measures attempt to make military capabilities more transparent and to clarify the intentions of military and political activities. Others establish rules regarding the movement of military forces **as** well as mechanisms for **verifying** compliance with such rules. These agreements are meant to build thrust among competing parties and  limit escalation.

While these elements of confidence building have emerged in the context of the Cold War rivalry, they have been increasingly **applied in** other regions of conflict with varying success. As we saw, India's CBMs vis a vis China and Pakistan differ both in origin, process and effectiveness. While Sino-Indian CBMs have emerged more out of gradual rapprochement and mutual understanding, the compelling factor in the evolution of Indo-Pak CBMs is the regular military engagements and mutual threat perceptions. Accordingly, despite low profile initiatives, the Sino-Indian CBMs have been far more effective than the numerous but blurred **Indo-Pak** CBMs. While trade has emerged as visible symbol of confidence building between India and China, the heightened paranoia about a perceive Indo-Pak military conflict has given a new boost to Track **II** diplomacy.

10.8 EXERCISES

- 1) Enumerate the key elements of Confidence building approach that evolved from the Cold War conflict between the superpowers.
- 2) Spell out the characteristic features of CBMs in Asia and explain how they differ from those in Europe?
- 3) Critically examine initiatives and effectiveness of CBMs between India and Pakistan.
- 4) Critically analyse the features and effectiveness of Sino-Indian CBMs.
- 5) Write a short note on trade as a CBM in India's diplomacy with China.