
UNIT 4 IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

How do people belonging to diverse persuasions and affiliations come to live together in a polity; and what are the norms that regulate such a political project? Wherever there are diversities, there would be ethnic and cultural minorities and majorities. What is the status, the polity grants to the minorities? The broad answer is that the only basis upon which people belonging to diverse persuasions can live together with some amount of civility in a deeply divided society is, in general, the recognition of pluralism and, in particular, the institutionalisation of minority rights. It is in the pluralist political ambience the identity of citizens can be guaranteed. Keeping these perspectives in focus, in this Unit, an attempt is made to examine at length the issues regarding identity and citizenship that surface in multicultural societies and offer some insights on Australia.

4.2 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the identity discourse in democratic polities;
- describe what is meant by 'politics of recognition';
- understand ethnic and racial differences in Australian society; and
- explain how minorities are politically represented in Australia.

4.3 IDENTITY DISCOURSE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITIES

In a democracy, one needs to ask, what are the most fundamental norms that regulate transactions within society? In other words, what are the politically consistent codes that regulate relationship between various segments of population, and within a particular segment?

4.3.1 Equality and Identity

Scholars have identified various such basic norms, but nothing seems to be more fundamental and superior to the norm of equality. There are various reasons why equality can and should be taken as a pre-requisite. There can be hopefully no argument against the idea of human equality in present times. The idea of equality is morally so strong that one can make no criticism of it. Besides, all other norms such as freedom, participation, toleration and democracy are, it can be argued, first and foremost based on the presumption of human equality. From the perspective of equality, we can evaluate relationships between castes, religious groups, and social classes; and also within each caste, religious community and social class so as to know the desirability or undesirability of a relationship. Besides, the idea of equality also enables us to examine social relationships within a community, say indigenous peoples, whose status we may seek to guarantee. Further, it is on the ground of equality, that we consider the idea of permanent majority rule, or majoritarianism, as against democracy and public ethics. Protection of minorities (who had always been out-numbered and out-voted in a democracy) is considered essential for survival of democracy itself. It is thus on grounds of equality that we consider protection of ethnic and cultural minorities as essential in a democratic set-up. Warding off the dangers of majoritarianism and protection of minority rights have thus become essential features of contemporary democratic discourse. As some scholars argue, unless we work out the resolution of the issue of minority rights, we may render cultural minorities vulnerable to significant injustices at the hands of the majority and in the process, exacerbate ethno-cultural conflicts.

It is assumed that in a democracy majorities are formed on specific and contingent issues. But it is never so in reality, more so, in culturally diverse societies, where ethnicity and race define permanent majorities and minorities. In such ethno-culturally pluralist societies, minorities do need legal and institutional protection. For, majoritarianism is both morally unappealing and politically hazardous. It negates the basic principle of democratic equality. Moreover, majoritarianism reveals impatience with the practices and beliefs of the minority groups. Majoritarianism also denies the legitimacy of minority identities, represent them as subversive or as harmful to something that is defined as 'national;' and insists that such groups assimilate into the culture and the identity of the majority, most often identified with and represented as the 'national'. Majority groups can thus contend that minority groups should abdicate their cultural markers and their specific identities and identify themselves solely as 'nationals'. In other words, 'nation' becomes identified with majority culture-some real and some pure fantasy. It inevitably leads to the denigration of minority cultures and ways of doing things; and may even be branded as subversive and 'anti-national.'

Cultural minorities may be coerced into assimilation or kept segregated into their cultural ghettos. Both had been practised in the past and failed as policy prescriptions; besides, in the first place, both are highly anti-democratic and authoritarian. Worst, both, in the name of uniting the nation and integrating the society, would end up in disuniting the nation and disintegrating the society. One therefore needs to think of ways in which minority groups can exist in conditions of mutual respect and civility not apart from but within a pluralist society.

Given the drawbacks of both assimilation and segregation, multicultural polities opt for a third strategy: that of safeguarding minority identities through grant of cultural rights, even as these groups are assured of universal rights. This approach is justified on same grounds as redistributive justice; vulnerable groups require the establishment of special measures. Here, a basic theoretical issue is involved. It is agreed that all individuals, as human beings, need access to what is called primary goods. The definition of primary goods should be expanded beyond freedom and

livelihood, etc. to cover also the need for identity and culture. In other words, in plural societies, what is required is to combine special rights of the minorities with the grant of equal rights to individuals as citizens; and to combine participation in shared institutions with the reproduction of group identities. Once it is acknowledged that all individuals need access to their culture and that societies are pluralist, the question that emerges is how different cultural groups can live with each other in a territorially bounded political community. Then we are no more concerned with, how these particularities can be transcended for the sake of national unity and social integration. The task is how to make a place for these identities in body politic. Such an exercise calls for a crucial move from ideas of assimilation and sameness to recognising and accommodating differences.

4.3.2 The Liberal-Communitarian Debate

Political theory has traditionally been divided between those who take the 'unencumbered' individual as the unit of political arrangements; and those who view communities as important for the self-definition of the individual. The liberal-individualist school abstract the idea of justice from its social affiliations and constitutive attachments, and consider individual as free of any kind of affiliation. The culture and beliefs of such individuals are relegated to the private sphere. On the political stage, such an individual appears as self-legislating and autonomous, 'unencumbered' by historical experiences, cultural values and beliefs and practices. In the liberal-individualist view, political institutions are designed to further the autonomy and well being of the individual. The divide between public and private sphere is important. Individuals are free to follow their particular conception of 'good' in their private lives but in the public sphere they must transcend their particularities by supporting common political norms. People subscribing to different doctrines of 'good' can live together only when they demarcate the public sphere-the sphere of constitutional and legal rules governing the body politic-and the private, that is the realm of individual and community conscience and commitment.

Several important political implications flow from these formulations. Firstly, the state should be neutral towards competing conception of the 'good'. Secondly, the political community is held together by impersonal bonds of mutual agreement dictated by a contract that in itself does not reflect any system of constitutive attachments. Thirdly, system of rights and liberties come to occupy lexical priority over competing conceptions of the 'good'. In sum, in the liberal-individualist view, neither the affiliative community of the individual nor a person's attachments to the community enter political calculations. It was precisely this argument that individuals can be seen as detached from their community and history that became the focus of criticism on liberal-individualism.

Communitarians had asked, who is this individual who proceeds to chart out political arrangements without any knowledge of who he is, and without being constituted by the prior notion of 'good'? Thus, communitarians came to question each and every assumption of the liberal-individualists. Communitarians argued that that there is nothing like an 'unencumbered' individual; rather human beings acquire their thick conceptions of the 'good' from their community. These conceptions-shaping and pervading beliefs, actions and commitments-of the members allow a moral point of view as opposed to the claims of a transcendental, universal reason of liberal-individualists. Communitarians proposed that firstly, self is embedded in and constituted by a network of traditions and historically constituted sets of meanings, and that this is of such overwhelming importance that the constitutive attachments of this self have to be recognised and honoured. The recognition is of some import for it allows us to build a caring community, a community dedicated to virtue. Secondly, the state is not neutral between competing conceptions of 'good'. Rather a political community should seek to realise the sets of common goals and purposes that already shape the

ties of associations among citizens. For, a vibrant political community cannot be based on impersonal and alienated contractual arrangements among strangers. It would be far too impersonal and alienated. Thirdly, in place of the suggestion that rights precede notions of the good, the communitarians advocate the 'politics of good'.

The communitarians focus on the lack of sociability, of affiliations, constitutiveness and substantive concepts of the good in liberal theory. There is a great deal of truth in all this. It has led us to appreciate the constitutiveness of the individual; and to recognise the fact that communities are a distinct good for their members. We realise that people both identify with and are identified by their community, and that we need to register this when designing political institutions and practices. But what happens when the community prescribed norms and ends truncates individual autonomy. The weakness of the communitarian view is that either individuals acquiesce or exit from the community. The challenge therefore is to balance with group rights with individual freedom and identity with citizenship.

It was Will Kymlicka who broke the impasse between the liberals and the communitarians. In his *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (1989) and *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1985), Kymlicka accomplished two theoretical tasks. He showed as to how the basic premises of liberalism could not be fulfilled without institutionalising the prerequisite of community; and he also showed how it was possible to merge the focus on community with a commitment to liberal values of freedom and equality. Kymlicka made the important argument that the premises of both liberal individualism and communitarianism could not be applied to multicultural societies. Liberal individualists proceed with the assumption that the political and cultural community are co-extensive. The communitarians similarly assume that it is the shared commitment of one cultural community that should be concretised as political norms. But most polities consist of different cultural groups, some of whom will be minorities and therefore vulnerable to cultural domination. Kymlicka concluded that neither of these two schools provides adequate theories for multicultural societies.

Simultaneously recognising the value of community as well as of liberal-individualist injunctions, Kymlicka worked out the implications of all this for multicultural societies; and thus made a contribution to political theory by carving out a space where the value of community and the minority rights are recognised. The value of his thoughts is that while he does not abdicate his commitment to liberal democracy, he insists- at the same time on minority rights. His arguments help us to (i) recognise the value of community; (ii) recognise that groups are unequally located and therefore understand the need to protect the rights of the minority groups; and (iii) temper the commitment to community with a commitment to the values of liberal democracy; and consequently, (iv) establish a case for the protection of minority rights from within liberal democratic theory.

His writings have led to the modification of communitarian critique of liberal individualism. One, the recognition of the value of culture should logically lead towards instituting protection for those cultures that are vulnerable, and under the threat of dissolution in multicultural societies. Secondly, the perceptions of communitarianism have to be mediated by an emphasis on both individual autonomy as well as the limits of group rights. Internally, the rights of the members should limit community rights. Externally, community rights should be limited by respect for other communities. In effect, we can profit from both the liberals and the communitarian formulations only when we combine, modify, and adapt them for the purposes of our multicultural societies.

4.4 'POLITICS OF RECOGNITION'

How to reconcile cultural diversities (that shape political attitudes and political power) and the idea of democratic equality and freedom? Noted Canadian scholar Charles Taylor has proposed the idea of 'politics of recognition'. It meant recognising specific minority rights including minority claims for exemptions, support, special representation and public symbols. The multicultural response to the claims of indigenous and national minorities was to involve them in a constitutional dialogue about regional autonomy and power-sharing in governmental institutions.

Of course, 'politics of recognition' can create all sorts of illiberal and undemocratic effects. Therefore, Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and others have also suggested that group rights must be firmly constrained by principles of human rights and equal individual citizenship. Besides, minority rights also need to be counter-balanced by fostering a shared public culture and civic identity that fully embrace cultural differences. The basic insight Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka had provided was that liberal democracy must respond to cultural heterogeneity with multicultural policies. States are not neutral; but state must be even-handed in dealing with differences; and that majority community must as well be told to appreciate the multicultural character of the society.

Certainly, achieving all this in reality has not proved easy. But it is undeniable that the problems multiculturalism responds to are very real. Societies that have ethnic and racial diversities cannot but have recourse to multiculturalism. Moreover, multiculturalism not only ensures participation and representation of minority groups, but it also safeguards democracy against the ever-present danger of 'tyranny of majority' or majoritarianism.

If multiculturalism is in crisis today, it is for no other reason than the fact the Western liberal democracies have so far been essentially symbolic and rhetorical in their commitments towards building multicultural democracies. Admittedly the need is, as has been discussed in Unit-14, for these countries to embrace multiculturalism even more deeply. At the same time, 'politics of recognition' does not mean that any and every practice and belief of the ethnic minorities and the indigenous peoples must be accepted and glorified. Building a successful multicultural democracy might require certain preconditions. At least three such preconditions for building a robust multicultural democracy can be identified. These are constitutionally entrenched rights; accommodationist policies; and a shared public identity.

- i) The first element contains basic cultural liberties listed in human rights conventions, protection against discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious grounds, as well as positive minority rights to exemptions, recognition, support, representation and autonomy. All such rights are considered necessary to guard against majority preferences. They protect autonomous individuals and vulnerable minorities against the tyranny of the majority that is always a potential danger in democratic regimes. Constitutional entrenchment of rights also protects individual liberty in intra-community context.
- ii) Yet multiculturalism is not all about displaying the rights of the minorities. It is also about designing institutions and implementing policies that allow cultural diversities to flourish and conflicting claims to coexist peacefully. These are areas of policy-making in which minorities have a claim to be involved but that will generally be decided by representatives of parliamentary majorities. Often multicultural policies involving minorities are of a general nature; in the sense that issues such as education, employment etc. just do not involve minority rights but are part of the larger social and cultural integration process. This means

that sustainable multiculturalism will need majority support within legislative institutions, in the public administration, and ultimately also among voters.

- iii) Democratic multicultural polities need policies that promote common civic identities within a diverse society. It is suggested that a shared commitment to constitutional principles and their underlying values is needed. Others have pointed out that this is not nearly enough. Majorities should not merely accept minority rights as constraints but also support policies that promote diversity. Be that as it may, mutual acceptance of multicultural rights, arrangements and constraints requires a shared sense of belonging, of common stakes and equal membership in a polity.

Politics of integration in a multicultural society must pose the question as to what it is that all citizens and communities are supposed to integrate into. On the one hand, an open civil society is essential for mutual tolerance and respect but it is not enough for sustained support for multicultural policies. On the other hand, national identities are too thick and exclusive to accommodate deep diversity. A shared political identity should instead emphasize the composite nature of the polity and highlight diversity as a basic feature of its history and as an asset for its future. The success of such policies can be measured by the extent to which a majority population accepts minority narratives as part of their own collective identity and the extent to which minorities combine group affiliations with a sense of belonging to the larger polity. Such a transformation of identities can only be brought about if the inevitable conflicts over cultural claims are debated openly so that all citizens feel they have a stake and a voice in such a dialogue.

The record of how well liberal democracies have managed to balance the three elements of sustainable multiculturalism is mixed and uneven. Some countries have strong anti-discrimination legislation. Others including for instance Australia have a poor record in addressing the claims of the indigenous communities including their rights as citizens. It has been noted that in countries where multicultural arrangements and policies have not been constitutionally entrenched, the minorities and indigenous have suffered more.

It has also been noted that in settler societies, such as Australia, Canada and the US, the imagined nation-hood had always included the diversity of the origin of the population, if not recognition of cultural differences. These countries are better placed to strike a balance between identity and citizenship through a multicultural discourse than, say, European countries where the native majorities think of multiculturalism as belonging to the 'others.' The European countries are beginning to admit, only reluctantly, that they too have become countries of immigration and their societies are highly diverse. Majorities in these countries however still find it very difficult to construct and accept new multicultural identities for their countries. Countries like Canada with its population originating in diversity have gone the farthest in constructing a multicultural identity not only for its immigrant minorities but also for the entire society. It is a basic feature of a shared Canadian identity. Similarly, for Australia, no matter how restrictive its immigration policies become and how diluted its multiculturalism is rendered, there is no escape from the truth that Australia is an immigrant country and its democracy need to propel the country in the direction of building a multicultural national identity. The risks, otherwise, are profound in the form of set-backs for its liberal and democratic character.

So is there a better response than multiculturalism? Conservatives have always argued that promotion of minority rights and identities results in 'disuniting of the nation'. They fail to understand that under the conditions of liberal democracy and cultural diversity, there is nothing more divisive than projects of forging monochromatic national identity. Multiculturalism had emerged as a

response to such divisions. It has balanced the scales that had been heavily tipped against cultural minorities and has created new opportunities for self-determined communal identities. Yet, if it is to succeed, it must also try to bridge the cleavages by transforming public identities of both minorities and majorities in such a way that they support a shared citizenship.

What is needed is, as Will Kymlicka has called, 'liberal multiculturalism.' Public institutions have a duty to accommodate ethno-cultural diversity, guided and constrained by the larger framework of a liberal-democratic constitution, with its firm protection of individual rights and non-discrimination. Over the past three decades, some countries have moved faster than others in this direction; and there were also set backs in other countries. One finds wide variability in the meaning and practice of multiculturalism including where countries are re-emphasising on the idea of a republican citizenship and relegating ethno-cultural diversities to the private realm.

4.5 IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN AUSTRALIA

Within culturally diverse societies, the challenge of building democratic politics involves two seemingly contradictory principles: (i) the principle of universalism. It means that one should be blind to the ethnic, racial and other differences among citizens. Rights and obligations are given to individuals irrespective of race, colour, caste, religion and gender etc. This becomes a civic identity; and those who enjoy the rights of citizenship are called, for example, Australians, Canadians, and Indians. (ii) The principle of difference, which means recognising and valuing the distinct ethnic, racial and other identities. Liberal theory now recognises that group or community identities cannot be either negated or denied. It involves recognition of distinct collective or group rights of communities which are essential for the preservation and promotion of their distinct culture as well as essential for the individual to realise his/her individual rights and self.

In Australia, there are many forms of ethnic and racial 'differences.' Australian political scientists, and to a lesser extent sociologists, have not paid sufficient attention to these ethno-cultural and racial 'differences.' Their main preoccupations have been with issues such as regionalism, class, federal-provincial relations and, of late, with gender and environment. Consequently, the political scientists and sociologists have ignored a number of formative and dynamic features of the Australian state and society. This however is not possible any more as Australia is rapidly becoming a heterogeneous society; and groups and communities are seeking political representation and empowerment.

There are two reasons for this changing character of the Australian society and politics. (i) As you would read in Unit 13, immigration and demographic trends, since the 1970s, have brought about an absolute decline in the ratio of White Anglo-Celtic population. Large immigration from various Asian and other countries is changing the character of the Australian population. (ii) A very large number of these immigrants have settled down in major cities and constitute an important section in the service sector of the economy. This growing urban diversity is raising questions about the cultural identity of Australia and about the state institutions and policies for the political representation and economic well being of various ethnic groups.

Australia's position within the British Empire and its status as an independent commonwealth meant that, historically, two sets of principles were played out in the formation of policies such as immigration, foreign affairs and governance of the aboriginals and non-whites. On the one hand, the imperial philosophy of a non-racial empire proclaimed that all subjects were equal before the law, regardless of race, colour or creed. On the other hand, a sense of racial superiority of all things Anglo-Celtic, including special capacity for self-governance through a constitutional system,

led to the impulse among British settlers to build a country that was as white and as British as possible. These two contradictory principles were played out in policy debates among politicians over immigration and citizenship rights for Asians and the aboriginals who were perceived as being inherently incapable of assimilation to the British culture of Australia without injury to British civilisation. In the 19th century Europe, there were pseudo-scientific theories, which had argued that only certain "kindred races" could successfully intermingle. Thus, it was believed that crosses of Aryan races could intermingle successfully; they therefore should not intermingle with Asiatics or Africans as it shall produce a mongrel race. This idea of 'race betterment' and fear of 'racial miscegenation' was thus used to exclude the Asians and the aboriginals from the rights of universal British citizenship. Thus, one of the historical discourses that designated immigrants from outside northern Europe as unsuitable settlers in Australia was their assumed inability to adapt to British civilisation and democratic political traditions.

Restrictive and discriminatory immigration policies were one of the main tools to keep the non-white immigrants out. The denial of citizenship rights to those who were allowed to enter in response to labour market demands was another. The idea was to develop Australia as a 'white settler nation.' Certainly, there were stray voices against such patently racist policies which invoked the principles of racial equality and appealed to the British sense of 'fair play' but they remained largely unheard. To overcome such ideological objections (but still persist with racist immigration and denial of citizenship rights) bizarre measures were adopted: such as imposition of head tax, or a strange literacy test, etc. Denial of the franchise through provincial and federal legislation reinforced the political marginality and subordination of the Asians, and made it harder for them to build links to the party and electoral systems. In most cases, the provincial laws denied representation even at the municipal level and school-trustee positions. In the inter-war period, many Asian groups were looked at with hostility and faced acute discrimination and isolation from party, electoral and parliamentary politics. Aboriginal peoples have experienced the most profound sense of isolation from the Australian polity, an isolation stemming from alienation of their land rights and paternalistic control mechanisms such as reserve system and the ongoing destruction of their traditional economies and cultures in the name of natural resource development and environmental conservation.

The political marginalisation of the non-white groups thus remains in the form of their non-representation or extreme under-representation in the legislatures. As and when ethnic minorities attain office in the parliament, they have had limited impact in shaping policies in a manner favourable to the ethnic groups they represented.

4.6 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES

The historical pattern of lack of representation or under-representation of 'visible' ethnic groups persists in the political parties and legislatures to the present times. Women from 'visible' ethnic minorities and racial groups face even more stupendous hurdles in political representation. As for the aboriginals, their absence is even more glaring than all else; and the prospects of an aboriginal women getting into parliament or getting a cabinet position are almost nil. The increased ethnic/racial diversity of Australia and increase in the presence of women in the Australian parliament do not get reflected in the formation of cabinet, which remains dominated by the Anglo-Celtic white males.

Why do ethno-cultural and 'visible' minorities continue to be under-represented or not represented at all in the key political institutions such as legislatures and cabinets? One general explanation is

their recent immigration experiences and the supposition that they may have less knowledge or incentive to participate in the political process. They are also more likely to face barriers to political participation such as language difficulties or apathy of conservative political parties to enlist them as members. Depending on when they had arrived and their present social status, immigrants may be more preoccupied with their economic and social survival than with political issues. Besides, political parties in Australia have not shown the required sensitivity and drive to recruit and incorporate 'visible' minority groups. In this regard, the Labour has historically been more open-armed than the Liberals and the conservatives.

It is undeniable that cultural, organisational and structural barriers have historically worked to restrict and discourage the participation of 'visible' ethnic and racial groups in the Australian politics, and the society at large. Historically, the hegemonic vision of Australian society reflected within the official and political party discourses has conveyed Anglo-conformity. This has meant that the collective identities, aspirations, and symbols of the British have been legitimised as being 'national' within the state and political party discourses, agendas, and policies. In contrast, those of the non-British groups have been suppressed and considered as 'non-national', if not outrightly as 'anti-national'.

4.7 SUMMARY

Since the 1970s, multiculturalism has been added to the kaleidoscope of ethnic policies as a means of accommodating the symbolic aspirations of non-British communities. In the 1980s, there were concrete moves to provide multiculturalism with a legislative and an institutional basis. However, its regressive immigrant policies, the low budgets and over-all symbolic nature of multiculturalism and the rise of anti-immigration and White supremacist political parties and movements have amplified the crisis in the multicultural discourse of Australia. Besides, the Liberal-National coalition has its own views on a restrictive immigration policy. A number of surveys carried out in recent years show that there is an increased popular opinion in favour of returning to the White Australia immigration policies and abandonment of multiculturalism.

Australia is a multicultural society; and will increasingly become even more diverse. It is adopting, sometimes with reversals, to the politics of differences. Ethnic and racial discrimination, which deprives 'visible' minorities' equal rights to full recognition as Australian citizens, is a reminder that individuals and institutions continue to view ethnic and racial distinctions as reasons to deprive people of their universal rights.

The challenge posed by the ethno-cultural and racial diversity to the Australian state and society as a whole is greater than the challenge of finding a balance between the contradictory principles of universalism, which treats all citizens equally regardless of differences and difference, which respects and promotes collective rights. Currently, there are different collective interests which correspond to the ethnic/racial divisions-aboriginal peoples, Chinese, Tamils and Arabs-each fuelled by its own sense of collective origins, injustice, and destiny, and each vying for protection and enhancement through diverse political strategies and state instruments.

Charles Taylor has suggested 'deep diversity' as the only formula on which a united federal nation can be rebuilt. In his view, 'first-level' diversity corresponds to the great differences in culture and outlook and the background in a population that nevertheless shares the same idea of what it is to belong to Australia. For Australians of all ethnic and racial backgrounds, their sense of belonging is associated with the feeling of Australia as a bearer of individual rights of citizenship in a multicultural mosaic. However, this 'first-level' diversity is insufficient for aboriginals and most of the 'visible'

ethnic and racial groups. It must be accommodated by a 'second-level,' or 'deep diversity'. For these collectivities, their sense of belonging to Australia occurs through 'being members of their national communities'. Many whites may find the idea of 'deep diversity' unacceptable on grounds of democratic principles of equality and inclusion. Therefore, it is also suggested that collective rights need to be tampered with values of individual freedom and equality.

4.8 EXERCISES

- 1) How is the principle of majority rule different from democratic equality?
- 2) Describe the Liberal-Communitarian debate. How were the two debates merged?
- 3) What are the elements of multiculturalism? Would you say that immigrant countries like Australia have a better understanding of cultural diversity and identity than non-immigrant societies?
- 4) Discuss immigration, formation of identity and citizenship rights in Australia.
- 5) What, in your understanding, are the problems Australia faces in its search to balance the challenges of the principles of universalism and difference?

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